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NATIONALIZING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: 
 
ASSESSING THE EFFECT OF BAEHR V. LEWIN ON THE FEDERAL 
 
DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT 
 
 
 Since the Defense of Marriage Act, the issue of same-sex marriage has dominated 
the political discourse of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender politics. Scholars claim 
that the litigation in Hawaii that took place in the 1990s was responsible for the 
subsequent political activity surrounding same-sex marriage in the United States, 
including the Defense of Marriage Act, but none has empirically tested this claim. This 
paper seeks to understand whether or not the litigation in Hawaii prompted congressional 
action that resulted in the introduction of the federal Defense of Marriage Act and if so, 
why. By using Kingdon’s multiple streams framework as a guiding tool, this research 
evaluated different political participants and factors to understand how the litigation in 
Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44; 1993) connects to the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act. This paper finds that the litigation in Hawaii is the catalyst that prompted 
the subsequent activity that resulted in the Defense of Marriage Act by energizing a well 
organized coalition opposed to same-sex marriage to expand the political debate and 

























































 The United States political debate over same-sex marriage has dominated the 
discourse of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights for the past decade 
(Goldberg-Hiller, 2002; Anderson, 2005; Pierceson, 2005; Rom, 2007; Mucciaroni, 2008; 
Rayside, 2008; Smith, 2008; Rayside, 2010). Political discussions of LGBT issues have 
moved away from funding for AIDS treatment and prevention, work place 
discrimination, and sodomy statutes and are instead heavily concentrated on the issue of 
relationship rights. All political avenues, including the courts, legislatures, executives, 
and direct democracy mechanisms, have been utilized in the debate to resolve the 
question of whether same-sex marriage should be legally recognized by individual states 
and the federal government. The first state Supreme Court decision in Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health (440 Mass. 309; 2003) that made it unconstitutional to deny 
same-sex couples the right to marry in Massachusetts set off a chain reaction throughout 
the United States that would focus proponents and opponents’ attention on same-sex 
marriage as a political and social reality.  
 Today, five states and Washington D.C. grant same-sex marriage licenses and 
seven states recognize same-sex unions or provide the equivalent benefits of marriage to 
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same-sex couples (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2011). While some 
progress has been made to recognize same-sex marriages and award these couples the 
government privileges of marriage, overwhelmingly the states have rejected the legality 
of same-sex marriage. Thirty states have constitutional amendments that define marriage 
as the legal recognition of a relationship that can solely exist between one man and one 
woman, and 37 states have laws that refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed 
in other states (Alliance Defense Fund, 2008).  
 While the issue of same-sex marriage has been heavily debated within the 
institutions of government for the past decade, the emergence of the issue of same-sex 
marriage onto the systemic and formal agenda came in the mid-1990s when Hawaii’s 
courts were litigating the legality of same-sex marriage. Scholarly sources claim that the 
litigation in Hawaii was the catalyst that prompted the subsequent political debate and 
activity over same-sex marriage including the first major piece of federal legislation on 
same-sex marriage, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 
Stat. 2419 & 2420 (1996) (Hull, 2001, 207; Koppelman, 2002, 150).  
 Many scholars have noted the connection between the litigation in Hawaii and the 
Defense of Marriage Act or have given historical accounts of the developments in Hawaii 
in relation to the LGBT community’s on-going fight for relationship rights (Chambers, 
2000; Feldblum, 2000; Hull, 2001; Goldberg-Hiller, 2002; Koppelman, 2002; Mezey, 
2007). Others have debated the legality of the decisions in the Hawaii courts and the 
Defense of Marriage Act (Keane, 1995; Ruskay-Kid, 1997; Strasser, 1997; Koppelman, 
2002; Harvard Law Review, 2004). No research has been done though to understand 
specifically whether or not the litigation in Hawaii was responsible for same-sex 
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marriage’s place on Congress’s agenda in the 1990s. Scholars have not traced the 
developments in Hawaii and in Congress to understand why Congress took up the issue 
of same-sex marriage in the summer of 1996, when same-sex marriage was not legally 
recognized in any state and the Hawaiian case of Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 
44; 1993) had yet to go to trial.  
 Understanding the emergence of same-sex marriage onto the agenda of Congress 
is important for several reasons. First, the Defense of Marriage Act is a unique piece of 
legislation. The Defense of Marriage Act is the first piece of federal legislation that 
defines marriage, which has historically and constitutionally been an area of policy 
reserved to the states. It is also the first of its kind to specify certain “public acts, records, 
and judicial proceedings” under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
that do not have to be recognized by another state (H.R. 3396, 1996).
1
 While Congress is 
allowed to “regulate the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be 
proved, and the effect thereof,” it has done so only on rare occasions to specify the 
manner in which an act should be recognized or extended protections to the states’ acts, 
records, and proceedings. Congress has never legislated which acts, records, or 
proceedings can be disregarded (H.R. 3396, 1996; Kersch, 1997). Both the congressional 
definition of marriage and the clarification of the Full Faith and Credit Clause may be 
considered by some to be an overreach of congressional authority (Keane, 1995; Ruskay-
Kid, 1997; Strasser, 1997; Koppelman, 2002; Harvard Law Review, 2004). 
                                               
1
  Article IV, Section I of the U.S. constitution states “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general 
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof” (archives.gov). 
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 Secondly, the Defense of Marriage Act is important as it implicates the civil rights 
of a particular group. Gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgenders historically have been 
discriminated against, and it can be argued that the Defense of Marriage Act continues to 
perpetuate that discrimination (Strasser, 2000). DOMA has been accused of violating the 
equal protection clause of the 14
th
 Amendment by singling out a particular group, 
homosexuals, for unequal treatment before the law (Harvard Law Review, 2004). Some 
argue that DOMA is also aminus-based legislation against a particular class, which was 
made unconstitutional in the Supreme Court case Romer v. Evans (517 U.S. 620; 1996) 
(Harvard Law Review, 2004; Gill v. Office of Personnel Management (699 F. Supp. 2d 
374; 2010)).
2
  It also denies a group the benefits and privileges of marriage on the basis 
of sexual orientation.  
 Lastly, the politicization of same-sex marriage in the 1990s has had profound 
implications for the LGBT community. Since the Defense of Marriage Act, LGBT 
interest groups have had to deal with the numerous repercussions of nationalizing the 
issue of same-sex marriage. Significant resources and attention have been diverted to the 
issue of marriage and relationship recognition, which originally may have been reserved 
for more popular LGBT community needs such as employment discrimination, open 
recognition in the military, the repeal of sodomy statutes, and recognition of and 
punishment for hate crimes based on sexual orientation (Goldberg, 1996; Egan & 
Sherrill, 2005).  
                                               
2
 The opinion for Romer v. Evans (517 U.S. 620; 1996) was announced on May 20, 1996, a week after the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act was introduced in the House. The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that 
Amendment 2 of Colorado’s Constitution, responsible for repealing and prohibiting the passage of future 
anti-discrimination ordinances based on sexual orientation, was unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy, who 
wrote the opinion, argued that Amendment 2 did not meet the requirements for the rational basis test, as it 
was purely aminus towards a particular group of people. 
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 Marriage itself has been a point of contention for the LGBT community since the 
Stonewall Era, as those in the community are torn between acceptance and recognition 
into a historically patriarchical institution and the outright rejection of marriage as a 
mechanism of oppression in heterosexual relationships (Rimmerman, 2000; Pierceson, 
2010; Rayside, 2010). The litigation in Hawaii and the subsequent passage of the Defense 
of Marriage Act also awakened a countermovement by religious conservatives against the 
LGBT efforts to achieve relationship recognition prompting the passage of several state 
statutes and constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage (Eskridge, 2002; 
Ball, 2006; D’Emilio, 2007; Rayside, 2010). The issue of same-sex marriage has fortified 
a powerful social movement, creating a new barrier that the LGBT community must 
overcome in order to achieve equality and recognition before the law.  
 This research seeks to understand whether or not the political activity in Hawaii 
over same-sex marriage prompted congressional action that resulted in the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act, and if so, why it prompted this response. To answer this 
question, this study will specifically examine how the issue of same-sex marriage is 
conceptualized and framed at the national level. This study will also evaluate the 
influence of relevant participants and political factors that resulted in the emergence of 
same-sex marriage as a congressional agenda item. To do this, I will use John Kingdon’s 
multiple streams framework as a starting point. This framework focuses on agenda 
setting in the policy process, specifically evaluating the actors and conditions responsible 
for an issue’s formal agenda status (Kingdon, 2003). An in-depth exploration of the 
events in Hawaii and Congress can help elucidate trends and develop patterns that can 
help explain if and how the events in Hawaii specifically connect to DOMA. 
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Understanding the connection between the two events can help inform the state of LGBT 
political discussions and the agenda setting literature more generally which has been 
relatively silent when it comes to issues that concern rights and morality.   
 This paper finds that the political activity in Hawaii in the 1990s was the catalyst that 
prompted Congress to take up the issue of same-sex marriage with the introduction of the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act. The legal developments in Hawaii brought same-sex 
marriage onto the systemic agenda, as it created awareness among political elites of the 
impending reality of same-sex marriage. The litigation in Hawaii however is not solely 
responsible for the emergence of the issue onto Congress’s formal agenda. The successful 
tactics of an organized anti same-sex marriage coalition and a complicit Congress both 
had a heavy hand in putting same-sex marriage onto the congressional agenda. The 
litigation in Hawaii was framed by an organized conservative movement as an impending 
threat to the traditional heterosexual institution of marriage, quickly propelling the issue 
of same-sex marriage onto the congressional agenda. A newly elected Congress with a 
Republican majority was willing to federalize the issue of same-sex marriage, as same-
sex marriage was not popular with the public and the passage of the Defense of Marriage 
Act would hence be beneficial to the Republican Party. Electoral forces surrounding the 
1996 presidential election were also a major contributing factor to same-sex marriage’s 
place in federal politics, as these forces helped foster issue salience among the public and 
government officials, and constrained the actions of elected officials concerned with 
reelection in the fall. The litigation in Hawaii is important to understanding the 
nationalization of same-sex marriage as it prompted the response from an organized 
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conservative coalition and Congress, and with the help of salient electoral and partisan 
forces became a federal political issue with the introduction of DOMA.  
 To understand how the paper arrives at this conclusion, this work will start by giving 
a historical account of the events in Hawaii and Congress during the debate and passage 
of the Defense of Marriage Act. This will help contextualize the case study and provide 
the reader with a historical understanding of the events. This paper will then examine the 
policy process literature on agenda setting specifically evaluating the applicability of 
relevant theoretical approaches. It will also include a discussion of the literature on the 
important participants and conditions that influence the agenda setting process, 
examining the specific factors relevant to this case study.  Next, a detailed account of the 
research design will be given. Thereafter, the paper will give a thorough analysis of the 



















THE HISTORY OF BAEHR V. LEWIN  




The History of Same-Sex Marriage in the State of Hawaii (1990-1999)  
 
 While the litigation in Hawaii was the first instance in which a court ruled in 
favor of same-sex marriage and the first to receive unprecedented national attention from 
the media and Congress, it was not the first time same-sex couples had filed for marriage 
licenses and upon denial of those licenses, filed a complaint or suit against the state. The 
1970s and 1980s are marked by several cases in which same-sex couples sought relief for 
the denial of marriage licenses (e.g., Baker v. Nelson (291 Minn. 310; 191 N.W.2d 185; 
1971), Jones v. Hallahan (501 S.W.2d 588; 1973), Singer v. Hara (530 F.2d 247; 1976), 
Adams v. Howerton (673 F.2d 1036; 1982), De Santo v. Barnsley (328 Pa. Super. 181; 
476 A.2d 952; 1984).  The cases took place in several states over the course of two 
decades, each plaintiff litigating on different constitutional grounds.  
 Many of the state courts used traditional dictionary or biblical definitions of 
marriage to argue that marriage was never intended to include same-sex couples.  
According to these courts, denial of marriage licenses was not sex discrimination or a 
denial of due process rights because same-sex couples were not entitled to marriage 
which was a heterosexual institution and were not guaranteed a fundamental right to 
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marry, as one had never existed for same-sex couples (Trosino, 1993; Mezey, 2007). 
They also cited the many state sodomy laws that prohibited homosexual sex, 
demonstrating that the laws would not legally recognize a relationship based on illegal 
activities. Ultimately, all litigation prior to 1993 had resulted in the denial of marriage 
licenses for same-sex couples, and all appeals by the plaintiffs were unsuccessful due to a 
concurrence with the lower court or dismissal by an appeals court. Baehr v. Lewin (74 
Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44; 1993) would be the first case to show the promise of success for 
same-sex couples, which quickly propelled the local litigation in Hawaii to the attention 
of politicians and citizens across the United States.  
 On December 17, 1990, three couples – Ninia Baehr and Genora Dancel, Tammy 
Rodrigues and Antoinette Pregil, and Pat Lagon and Joseph Melilio – applied for 
marriage licenses with Hawaii’s Department of Health. Hawaii’s marriage statute 
contains certain requisites that a couple must meet in order to enter into a valid marriage 
contract. These requirements among others include an age minimum, a barring of certain 
marriage contracts based on relation, and a confirmation that each person is not lawfully 
married to another at the time of application (Hawaii Revised Statutes §572-1). While 
there are gendered terms throughout the text implying that individuals seeking a license 
should be of the opposite sex, no statute specifies that the couple entering marriage must 
be composed of individuals of the opposite sex.  
 On April 12, 1991, the three couples were all denied marriage licenses, as the 
Department of Health had interpreted the statute’s gendered terms to indicate that same-
sex couples did not have the right to marry. On May 1, 1991, the couples filed a 
complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief with Hawaii’s First Circuit Court, arguing 
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that their right to privacy had been violated and that the couples were not afforded equal 
protection and due process of the law, which are explicitly written into the Hawaii State 
Constitution. Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, the largest and oldest national 
organization litigating on behalf of the LGBT community, after previously rejecting 
involvement with the case, chose to join as co-counsel. After several motions from both 
sides, in early October 1991, the First Circuit Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaints, 
defending Hawaii’s Department of Health Secretary, John Lewin, and the State’s motion 
for judgment. The court claimed that the plaintiffs did not have a legitimate claim on 
which they could be granted relief (Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44 1993, 3).  
 The plaintiffs immediately appealed the case to the Hawaii Supreme Court. The 
court agreed to review the First Circuit Court’s decision. In May of 1993, a divided court 
chose to vacate and remand the case back to the Circuit Court for trial (Baehr v. Lewin, 
74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44 1993, 16).  Judge Levinson in his judgment in which Chief 
Judge Moon joined, affirmed the plaintiff’s complaints that their case had been 
erroneously dismissed. The Supreme Court threw out the plaintiff’s claims of a violation 
of their right to privacy and due process as they argued the U.S. Constitution, the Hawaii 
Constitution, and previous precedent did not indicate that the fundamental right to marry 
extended to same-sex couples (Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44 1993, 4).  
 They did however argue that discrimination on the basis of sex, inherent in 
Revised Statute §572-1 and as interpreted by the Department of Health in the denial of 
marriage applications to the plaintiffs, violated the Hawaiian constitution’s equal 
protection clause which states that “"[n]o person shall . . . be denied the equal protection 
of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be discriminated 
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against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex, or ancestry" (Haw. Const. 
art. I, § 5; Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44 1993, 7). Using state and national 
precedent, along with the application of the Hawaii Constitution which contains an Equal 
Rights Amendment, the court argued that HRS §572-1’s sex-based discrimination would 
be tested under the strict scrutiny standard which under the Hawaii Constitution would 
henceforth be considered a suspect classification (Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 
44 1993, 15). The case was vacated and remanded to the circuit court for trial, where the 
defendant, Lewin, would have to demonstrate a compelling state interest that was 
narrowly tailored to that interest in order to continue to bar same-sex couples from 
obtaining marriage licenses. 
  Justice Burns concurred, arguing that the case should be vacated and remanded to 
a trial court but the plaintiffs would first have to demonstrate that sexual orientation was 
biologically determined rather than a lifestyle choice in order for Hawaii’s equal 
protection clause to be applicable to this case (Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44 
1993, 16-18). One justice dissented on the grounds that same-sex marriage was not a 
fundamental right, and could not be extended to same-sex couples (Baehr v. Lewin, 74 
Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44 1993, 18-22). Judge Heen argued that marriage was innately 
heterosexual, as its purpose was intimately tied to the begetting of children (Baehr. v. 
Lewin, 74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44 1993).  
 Responding to the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 
530; 852 P.2d 44; 1993), the Hawaii legislature held numerous public hearings on the 
issue of same-sex marriage in the fall of 1993 (H.R. 3396, 1996). Public opinion polls in 
Hawaii demonstrated that the majority of Hawaii residents were opposed to the 
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recognition of same-sex marriages with numbers against hovering around 70% (Yuen, 
1998; Brewer & Wilcox, 2005). In response to the public’s concern, during the following 
legislative session, the legislature passed Act 217, which revised the Hawaii statute §572-
1 to include a clause that explicitly reserved the contract of marriage to a man and a 
woman and set up a commission to research same-sex marriage and the distribution of 
marriage benefits to same-sex couples. In December of 1995, the committee 
recommended that the legislature halt all interference with Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 530; 
852 P.2d 44; 1993) and recognize marriage rights by extending them to same-sex couples 
(Dunlap, 1995; Guillerman, 1997; Goldberg-Hiller, 2002). The committee’s decision was 
largely dismissed by the legislature.   
 Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44; 1993), for procedural reasons, was 
changed to Baehr v. Miike (92 Haw. 634; 994 P.2d 566; 1999) to reflect the new director 
of the Department of Health, Lawrence Miike, and was scheduled for trial in September 
of 1996. By this point, several states and the national media had picked up on the legal 
battle in Hawaii (Haider-Markel, 2001). Many states, seeing Hawaii’s contentious 
litigation as imminent in their state, preempted a similar legal battle by proposing 
legislation that would seek to bar the legalization of same-sex marriage and deny 
recognition of same-sex marriages from other states. By the end of 1996, 16 states had 
enacted legislation that would preempt them from having to recognize same-sex 
marriages performed in other states, 15 of which took place in 1996 alone (Barclay, 
2010). Before the case was heard by the circuit court, a flurry of activity was also taking 
place in Congress that would quickly nationalize the issue of same-sex marriage to an 
unprecedented place on the national and state governments’ agendas.  
13 
Moving from Hawaii to Congress: The Defense of Marriage Act  
 
 On May 7, 1996, Congressional Representative Bob Barr (R: GA-7) introduced 
H.R. 3396: The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) to the U.S. House of Representatives. 
The next day Senator Don Nickles (R: OK) introduced S.1740: The Defense of Marriage 
Act to the U.S. Senate. The identical bills proposed that 
No state, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian 
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or 
judicial proceeding of any other state, territory, possession, or tribe 
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is 
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such 
relationship. (H.R. 3396, 1996) 
 
This would mean that states would not have to recognize same-sex marriages performed 
in other states under to the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States 
Constitution. The bill also amended the United States Code to clarify that marriage for 
federal purposes is defined as a “legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife” and that the term spouse “refers only to a person of the opposite sex 
who is a husband or a wife” (H.R. 3396, 1996).   
 The bill was referred to the House Judiciary Committee and reported out on July 
9, 1996.  The report from the House Judiciary Committee cited the need for the Defense 
of Marriage Act as it was a direct response to the developing events in the state of 
Hawaii that were troubling for the traditional institution of marriage and the sovereignty 
of the states to choose to recognize same-sex marriages (H.R. Rep. No. 664, 1996, 1). 
The House Committee’s report discussed the “strong possibility” of the first legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage in Hawaii due to the application of the strict scrutiny 
standard that presumed the Hawaii marriage law to be unconstitutional. The report 
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claimed that this unprecedented ruling by an activist court would cause drastic 
implications for litigation in the area of marriage, as states would be forced to recognize 
same-sex marriages from other states by application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
(H.R. Rep. No. 664, 1996, 6-7). The committee also argued that the legal recognition of 
same-sex marriages in Hawaii would have drastic legal implications for the federal 
government, which has several statutory laws that use the word “marriage” and “spouse” 
to determine the allocation of rights and benefits of certain federal programs (H.R. Rep. 
No. 664, 1996, 11).  This undue pressure on the states and the federal government along 
with the uncertainty of subsequent litigation was said to be the reason Congress drafted 
federal legislation that would protect the states from recognizing this type of marriage 
(H.R. Rep. No. 664, 1996).  
 Three days after it was reported out of committee, H.R. 3396 was passed and 





Session Roll Call Vote 316). Two months later, on September 10,
 
1996 the Senate 




 Session Roll Call 
00280). Shortly thereafter, on Sept 21,
 
1996, President Clinton signed the bill making 
The Defense of Marriage Act law, preventing the federal government and other states 
from having to recognize same-sex marriages. While the Defense of Marriage Act is 
cited as a response to the litigation in Hawaii, it was largely a preemptive measure as the 
act was actually codified in law a few months before Hawaii’s Circuit Court ruled on the 
legality of same-sex marriage in the state of Hawaii (Hull, 2001; Koppelman, 2002; 
Mezey, 2007).   
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 It was not until several months later in December 1996 that Judge Kevin Chang 
of the First Circuit Court issued the court’s ruling that the Department of Health was 
unable to articulate a compelling state interest that would justify denying same-sex 
couples the right to marry. Ultimately, the court declared, “the sex based classification in 
HRS §572-1, on its face and as applied, is unconstitutional and in violation of the equal 
protection clause of Article I, Section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution” (Baehr v. Miike, 
1996 WL 694235, Hawaii Cir.Ct., 23). This was the first moment in United States 
history that same-sex couples were legally allowed to enter into a valid marriage 
contract and receive the same privileges as opposite sex couples.  
 While Baehr v. Miike (1996 WL 694235, Hawai'i Cir.Ct.) was a major victory for 
the gay and lesbian community in Hawaii, the success of the case was short lived. While 
the decision was in the appeals process, the Hawaii legislature drafted and passed House 
Bill 117 proposing a constitutional amendment, pending voter approval, that would give 
the legislature the authority to enact a ban on same-sex marriage. In November of 1998, 
the voters approved the amendment by a margin of 69.2% to 28.6%, which in effect 
validated Act 217 of the legislature that revised the Hawaii statues to define marriage as a 
relationship between a man and a woman (State of Hawaii: Office of Elections, 1998). 
The ambiguity between the First Circuit Court’s ruling in Baehr v. Miike (1996 WL 
694235, Hawai'i Cir.Ct.) and the passage of the constitutional amendment made it 
necessary for the Hawaii Supreme Court to decide which application of the law carried 
weight. On December 9, 1999 the Supreme Court ruled that the passage of the marriage 
amendment made HR §572-1 a valid statute that was no longer in violation of the equal 
protection clause (Baehr v. Miike, 92 Haw. 634; 994 P.2d 566; 1999). Ultimately the 
16 
plaintiffs’ complaint for relief was irrelevant in light of the passage of the marriage 
amendment.  
 Almost nine years to the day that Nina Baehr and the plaintiffs filed for marriage 
licenses, the three couples and the rest of the gay and lesbian community were still unable 
to receive a valid marriage license from the state of Hawaii. In many ways, they and the 
rest of the gay and lesbian community nationwide were in a worse predicament. The 
passage of the Defense of Marriage Act created yet another barrier to relationship 
recognition and prompted the subsequent passage of 26 state laws prohibiting same-sex 
marriages and 37 mini Defense of Marriage Acts (Alliance Defense Fund, 2008; Barclay, 
2010). The ruling by the Hawaii Supreme Court in 1999 also highlighted the unnecessary 
consideration of same-sex marriage by Congress, as the litigation that allegedly prompted 
the discussion about same-sex marriage and the Defense of Marriage Act would 























 The Defense of Marriage Act is unique because it is the first federal policy to deal 
specifically with the issue of same-sex marriage. Prior to its introduction in Congress, the 
states were solely responsible for the regulation of marriage, and no federal legislation 
specifically addressed the issue of marriage.
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 Because same-sex marriage had not been a 
political issue at the national level prior to 1996, it is important to understand how it 
became an important policy problem that the federal government chose to address.  
Policy process literature will be most relevant to this study as it is used to understand how 
“problems are conceptualized and brought to government for solution” (Sabatier, 2007, 
3). To understand this extremely complicated policy process, it is important to use a 
theoretical lens “to distinguish between the set of potentially important variables and 
casual relationships and those that can safely be ignored” (Sabatier & Jenkins, 1993, xi). 
Theories of the policy process allow us to examine this complex process by which issues 
come to be viewed as problems and the myriad ways in which those problems are solved 
through policy (Cobb & Elder, 1972, 14; Kingdon, 2003, 2). In particular this study will 
be best suited by applying theories of agenda setting, as this process can conceptualize 
how same-sex marriage became a political issue debated within the walls of Congress. 
                                               
3
 There are thousands of federal statutes that mention marriage for the purpose of doling out government 
benefits such as military policies and Social Security.  
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Several theoretical models have been constructed to analyze the process of agenda 
setting, and they will be useful to help understand the factors that culminate in the 
Defense of Marriage Act. These theories address the following questions: Why does the 
government address some issues at a particular time and not others? Why does a 
particular issue gain agenda prominence at a particular time? How is that issue defined? 
What are the mechanisms that lead to a government institution’s interest in an issue?  
The Agenda 
 
 To answer these questions we must first analyze what the agenda is and how 
issues gain prominence on that agenda based on different theoretical frameworks. Some 
refer to the agenda as  “the group of political controversies that at a given point of time 
will be considered worthy of concern and attention from the polity” (Cobb & Elder, 1972, 
85). Others conceptualize the agenda as a “list of subjects or problems to which 
government officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those 
officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time” (Kingdon, 2003, 3). Cobb 
and Elder (1972) make two distinctions to help conceptualize the term “agenda”: the 
systemic agenda and the formal agenda. The systemic agenda refers to all issues that are 
on the radar of several different conglomerates of the political community, as these issues 
are perceived as relevant and within the scope of government jurisdiction (Cobb & Elder, 
1972, 85). These issues are not necessarily ones that currently are being addressed by 
different government institutions but all have the potential to be moved from the systemic 
agenda to the more formal agenda. To be a part of the systemic agenda the issue must be 
well known or recognizable to the public, it must be considered a concern that merits 
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government attention, and is within the scope of legitimate government action to help 
rectify the problem or concern (Cobb & Elder, 1972, 86).  
 The formal agenda, which has also been characterized as the government agenda 
or the institutional agenda, consists of “a set of items explicitly up for the active and 
serious consideration of authoritative decision makers” (Cobb & Elder, 1972, 86). To be 
on the formal agenda the issue must be an active focus of government as illustrated by its 
presence on a court’s docket or a congressional timetable. A place on the formal agenda 
does not necessarily mean the creation or passage of policy will result. It only means that 
a venue or multiple venues of government have taken up an issue for serious 
consideration. The process of agenda setting examines how a particular issue becomes a 
part of the formal agenda. This is especially important given the fact that the government 
is limited to a finite group of people with limited resources and limited time to address all 
issues important to the public (Cobb & Elder, 1972; Hilgartner & Bosk, 1988; O’Toole, 
1989). Not only are there limited resources available, but inherently a mobilization of 
bias also exists, created by historical tradition and those who control the agenda (Cobb & 
Elder, 1972, 10). This inherent bias works to legitimate particular issues as appropriate 
and important ones for the government to address, while excluding agenda access to 
others. 
 To examine how issues become a part of the formal agenda, several factors need 
to be taken into account. One must understand how an issue becomes defined as a 
problem deserving of a government solution. It also means examining the complex 
process by which many different factors interact with one another to result in the 
placement of an issue on the government agenda.  
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Several literatures have been written that develop propositions and frameworks that give 
scholars tools to analyze the agenda setting process. The following will give a theoretical 
account of some important and influential literature on the process of agenda setting.   
Structural Frameworks  
 Several authors have created structural frameworks that scholars can use to assess 
how these different concepts interact to influence the agenda setting process.  Each has its 
own theoretical value and conceptualizes the very messy process of policy making. A 
quick overview of some of the dominant frameworks will help show the variety of ways 
scholars link different influential factors and theorize about how issues are transformed 
into government policy. In this study, I evaluated each of these frameworks to assess 
which scholars’ interpretation of the policy process would be most useful in 
understanding if and how the litigation in Hawaii relates to the Defense of Marriage Act. 
The following will give a brief account of these frameworks and justify the use of 
Kingdon’s multiple streams framework in this study.     
 Baumgartner and Jones’ Punctuated Equilibrium. 
 
 Baumgartner and Jones take issue with the fact that many authors see 
policymaking as a process of incrementalism in which policy is constructed in institutions 
and slowly developed among rather stable issue networks. Some authors do conceive of 
the more volatile changes in policy but those authors that do so, do not account for the 
more incremental nature of some policy areas. Baumgartner and Jones attempt to 
combine these two views to create a more long-term holistic theory of agenda setting and 
policymaking (True, Jones, & Baumgartner, 2007, 158; Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, 9-
12).  Baumgartner and Jones argue that policymaking is neither incremental nor episodic 
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but can instead be characterized by periods of stability or equilibrium in policy 
interrupted by periods of rapid and volatile instability that can drastically alter the 
previous policy landscape (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, xvii). Policymaking subsystems, 
those that many authors claim are responsible for long periods of stability are themselves 
both evolutionary and dynamic bodies that can be dramatically altered by changes in the 
policy process. These subsystems – iron triangles, issue networks, policy subsystems, or 
issue niches – are only a snapshot of a much more dynamic policymaking process (True 
et al., 2007, 158; Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, 8). Understanding the policy process 
involves a thorough understanding of how periods of stability in strong policy subsystems 
quickly can be weakened or dismantled by critical junctures in the development of policy.  
 Two mechanisms are responsible for the changes in the process of policymaking, 
which oscillates between change and stability. Policy images are one of the significant 
mechanisms that have the ability to alter the process of policy making. These images and 
their manipulation are important for the determination and consolidation of 
subgovernments as well as the destruction of those subgovernments. Policy images, 
relying on both emotive appeals and factual information, are crafted to create different 
portrayals of an issue (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, 26). These policy images frame an 
issue in a positive or negative manner so as to further the interests of a particular policy 
subgovernment. Policy images are integral to the stability of a policy subgovernment, as 
strategically crafted images in favor of the subgovernment will reinforce positive 
association among the public with those who currently control that policy arena. If a 
policy image is relatively uncontested in the public or among government officials, 
subgovernments will monopolize particular issues. On the other hand, the ability to 
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change the construction of policy images is a powerful tool by which policy 
entrepreneurs and other interested parties who are not a part of the subgovernment, can 
shape both the systemic and formal agenda (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, 26-30). The 
change in image can shift the debate by creating a new lens that draws on new empirical 
information and new emotive sentiments. These changes can lead to the expansion of an 
issue that may disrupt or dismantle previous subgovernment, shifting the issue from the 
relative privacy of a particular subgovernment to more visible macro-political institutions 
leading to new and dramatic changes in policy (True et al., 2007, 163; Baumgartner & 
Jones, 2009, 79-80).  
  Change in institutional venue is another mechanism that affects policy process 
dynamics. Institutional venues that deal with policy formation are those that make 
authoritative decisions concerning policy. Certain policy images may be more receptive 
in one policy venue than another due to each institution’s different membership 
composition, decisions rules, and informal norms (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, 31). 
When an issue moves from one policy venue to another or becomes shared by multiple 
institutions, there can be drastic changes in the formation of policy. Hence secure policy 
subsystems are created by deliberate attempts to keep an issue within the jurisdiction of 
one policy arena. Changing policy subsystems may result from variations in institutional 
control. Baumgartner and Jones (2009) argue that the interaction between images and 
venues “can produce long periods of no change or dramatic reversals in outcomes in 




 Sabatier and Jenkin’s Advocacy Coalition Framework. 
 The advocacy coalition framework, another theoretical approach that examines 
public policy change, is built on three premises. The theory is based on the idea that 
understanding policy change involves a longitudinal understanding of a particular subset 
of policy. Studies that encompass a decade or more are essential to capture the dynamics 
at play in the shaping of policy. Another premise argues that policy subsystems, rather 
than individual policies or governmental entities, should be the primary unit of analysis. 
The third, in conjunction with the second, claims that policy subsystems need to have an 
intergovernmental dimension in order to capture all of the actors involved in the process 
of policymaking. Focusing primarily on a particular branch of government will only 
highlight one influence on policy (Sabatier, 1993, 16-18).  
 These policy subsystems that specialize in a particular area of policy are made up 
of elites from several different sectors of the population including government officials, 
policy specialists, agencies, state officials, journalists, and businesses who have an 
interest in influencing policy relevant to that policy subsystem (Sabatier, 1993, 18).  
These policy subsystems are further divided into advocacy coalitions that are made up of 
people within a policy subsystem that “share a particular belief system – that is, a set of 
values, casual assumptions and problem perceptions” who strategically coordinate to 
influence policy (Sabatier, 1993, 25). These actors pursue their interests in coordination 
with their shared belief systems focusing first on core beliefs and then on more secondary 
beliefs and values. These advocacy coalitions must strategize how to influence 
government while taking into account both relatively stable parameters of the system 
such as the legal structure of the system and fundamental cultural values, and more 
24 
dynamic system events such as governing coalitions and socioeconomic conditions 
(Sabatier, 1993, 20-23). The advocacy coalition framework is best at conceptualizing the 
policy learning element of advocacy coalitions and the intergovernmental dimension of 
policymaking.  
The Limitations of Both  
 
 While each has its own theoretical value and has been influential in the field of 
public policy, both are not appropriate for this examination of agenda setting for the issue 
of same-sex marriage in this study. Both of these theoretical approaches call for long 
temporal studies to examine the dynamics of change over the course of several years, if 
not decades (Sabatier, 1993, 16; Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, 46-47). This study focuses 
specifically on the process of agenda setting of a new issue, same-sex marriage, by 
looking at the events in Hawaii, which are said to be responsible for the movement of the 
issue to the formal agenda of Congress. This time period lasts no more than five years, 
and much of the focus of this study centers on one particular year. Because this study 
looks at the micro-processes of events that lead to the Defense of Marriage Act, it would 
be difficult to apply either theory. A study that examines the issue of same-sex marriage 
over the past few decades would benefit from the use of either the advocacy coalition 
framework or punctuated equilibrium theory but that focus is beyond the scope of this 
study.  
 While both of these models have made significant contributions to the field of 
public policy and are important to understand the agenda setting process, Kingdon’s 
multiple streams framework is most applicable for understanding the complex factors 
involved in explaining the emergence of same sex marriage as an issue worthy of 
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Congress’s attention. Kingdon’s multiple streams model does not focus on coalitions or 
subsystems but instead focuses on processes that can show more intricate dynamics of 
how different actors, conditions, and structures affect the agenda setting process. Because 
this study focuses on a short time frame and seeks to capture the more acute dynamics of 
agenda setting, this process would benefit most from an in-depth analysis of the many 
factors relevant to the agenda setting process. To that end, this study will use Kingdon’s 
multiple streams model to examine if and how the events in Hawaii lead to the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act.  
Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Model  
 Kingdon’s multiple streams model is constructed to explain why some issues 
attain agenda status and why some policy alternatives are selected rather than others. 
Kingdon’s model is based on the premise that policy processes, particularly agenda 
setting, cannot be funneled down to a single casual explanation (Kingdon, 2003, 76). It is 
impossible to pinpoint the origin of an issue, as each topic has its own historical 
development that would lead scholars down a path of infinite regress. It is also 
impossible to pinpoint a particular casual relationship between an independent variable 
and a dependent variable as the policy process is littered with multiple causations 
(Kingdon, 2003, 76). These multiple causations exist due to the fragmented nature of 
U.S. policy making in which many structures are responsible for a policy’s existence. 
Because no monopoly on the decision process, information, or the goals of policymaking 
exists, there are bound to be multiple factors that influence the agenda and policy change 
(Kingdon, 2003, 77). Understanding agenda setting in the context of this project involves 
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an in-depth exploration of how several different factors, working in several different 
process streams interact with one another to produce agenda status of a particular item.  
 The multiple streams framework is based on March, Cohen, and Olsen’s garbage 
can model that conceptualizes organizations as organized anarchies that have problematic 
preferences, unclear technology and fluid participation making the decision making 
process of any one of these organizations dynamic (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972). 
These structures have different streams, problems, solutions, participants, and choice 
opportunities running through them, which influence the shape of the decisions that are 
made in these organizations (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972). Kingdon, borrowing from 
this approach conceptualizes the federal government as organized anarchy that contains 
several different streams (Kingdon, 2003, 84-85). Instead of focusing on subsystems or 
coalitions as the unit of analysis, this model focuses on the entire system to see how 
processes interact with one another to affect the agenda of a particular issue and influence 
policy change. The model conceptualizes three processes or streams that each 
independently operate according to their own rules and dynamics (Kingdon, 2003, 88). 
  The first stream, the problem stream, conceptualizes how problems are defined 
and framed. It also captures how these problems grab the attention of the public and 
government officials. These problems can be defined by focusing events, indicators, or 
powerful symbols that demonstrate on their own or with the strategic interpretation of a 
policy entrepreneur that a problem exists (Kingdon, 2003, 98). The second stream, the 
politics stream, is made up of the political events, conditions and actors that have an 
influence on the policy process. Kingdon argues that the national mood, organized 
interests, and government processes are integral in the policymaking process and have a 
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significant effect on what items will and will not gain formal agenda status (Kingdon, 
2003, 145-146). The last stream, the policy stream, captures the process by which 
alternative policy proposals are created. This stream is based on Kingdon’s assertion that 
policy proposals are not necessarily tied to particular problems but are instead formulated 
as desired policy by an interested party who utilizes a particular problem or political 
climate to introduce their policy alternative (Kingdon, 2003, 143-144). All of the streams 
while operating with their own dynamics are still endogenous to the policy process. 
 These three streams are assumed to be largely independent of one another and 
operate simultaneously until a policy window opens. This policy window, which opens 
for only a short period of time, is activated by changes in the problem or politics stream, 
which creates an opportunity for an issue to move towards active consideration on the 
agenda (Kingdon, 2003, 168). It is in this policy window that a policy entrepreneur can 
use his or her skills to couple the various streams together. Coupling means linking the 
streams by creating cognitive links between problems, solutions, and politics and is 
integral for successful policy change. Kingdon claims that while it is not necessary for all 
three streams to converge, it is more likely legislation will pass when all three streams are 
coupled (Kingdon, 2003, 178-179).  
 This study will focus primarily on the politics and problem stream. Because 
policy windows are opened through the politics stream and problem stream and because 
this model shows how these two streams influence agenda status, they will be most 
important to understand this case.  While it is important to explore how the Defense of 
Marriage Act was constructed in the policy stream, it is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
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Hypothetically, many other versions of this bill could have been introduced, but it is not 
relevant to the discussion of how same-sex marriage became a formal agenda item.
4
 
 Kingdon discusses several participants both inside and outside of government that 
have a potential impact on the system and policy change. These include actors that are a 
part of government such as members of Congress, the president, the administration, 
bureaucrats, and congressional staff and those outside of government such as interest 
groups, election related participants, the media, and academics. Kingdon specifically 
distinguishes between participants and processes to capture the influence of these 
participants in each separate stream. This means that all of these participants can be 
influential within one or several of the streams and can be found in multiple areas of 
policy development (Kingdon, 2003, 21-65).   
 The list of participants and stream influences is extensive, but for issues of 
brevity, this literature review will only highlight the ones that may be relevant to the 
study of the agenda setting process in relation to this case study of same-sex marriage and 
the Defense of Marriage Act. These participants will include members of Congress, the 
President, the media, and interest groups. The factors related to the politics stream 
include public opinion, election influences, and partisanship. While Kingdon’s study is 
thorough in his discussion of participants and processes, his case studies of transportation 
and health in the U.S. Congress lead him to dismiss some variables as unimportant or 
irrelevant. Kingdon finds that the media has very little influence on the agenda setting 
process (Kingdon, 2003, 57-61). This project will include an analysis of the influence of 
                                               
4 I would speculate that any policy created would have been both detrimental to the gay and lesbian 
community and would not have extended its reach much farther, as this act itself is already considered an 
overreach of the federal government’s power into the issue of marriage.  
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the media, as the issue of same sex marriage is presumably an issue that would obtain a 
greater degree of media salience compared to transportation and health issues due to the 
topic’s controversial and symbolic nature. This analysis will also look at the influence of 
states, which Kingdon leaves out of his analysis. Because marriage is considered a state 
issue, it is important to see the degree to which state agendas influenced the national 
agenda with regards to same-sex marriage. Examining each of these participants and 
stream influences on the policy process is important to understand how each is 
responsible for the emergence of same-sex marriage onto the formal agenda.  
The Problem Stream: Definition and Attention 
 In order for an issue to become part of the formal agenda, the issue must be 
defined as a problem that requires attention. Deborah Stone (1997) argues that policy is 
meant to obtain objectives in light of particular goals or aims. These goals are defined by 
overarching, more nebulous concepts by which government decision makers are able to 
construct legitimate policy. She argues that equity, efficiency, security, and liberty are 
contested “goals” that are continuously constructed and reconstructed in the polity 
(Stone, 1997, 37). Each person has a different interpretation of each concept and assigns 
a different value to each concept in relation to the others, making these goals subject to a 
continuous debate in the construction of public policy.  Because these goals are disputed, 
problem definition is not always a simple unanimous understanding that change is 
necessary to get to a stated goal. Problems may be self evident and uncontested among 
the public, such as the occurrence of a natural disaster that leaves thousands homeless 
without fresh water or food. Others may be less obvious, and many will not have the 
public’s unanimous recognition that a problem exists.  Problem definition can be disputed 
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by differing segments of society who assign different levels of importance to different 
issues. An example would be the issue of homelessness. Some might argue that 
homelessness is a condition that is not a problem but a fact of life. Others may say that 
homelessness is a problem but that the government does not have a responsibility to 
address the issue. Still others may say that homelessness is a problem that the 
government must try to strategically alleviate. Each group has used value judgments 
about equity, efficiency, security, and liberty to decide how the issue will be defined and 
whether it is deserving of government attention.  
 Problems are “strategic representations of situations” constructed by actors who 
“deliberately and consciously fashion portrayals so as to promote their favored course of 
action” (Stone, 1997, 133).  Problem definition is in itself a political process by which 
government officials assign importance to particular goals and values, and then frame 
issues to be problems deserving of government attention so as to legitimate their 
particular goals. It is critical to define a condition or issue as a problem in order to 
increase an issue’s chance of promotion to the formal agendas of government (Kingdon, 
2003, 207). 
 Problems can be defined in several different manners, each of which has 
ramifications for the likelihood that people will view that issue as an important problem 
that necessitates government intervention. Because everyone does not agree on the 
importance of different goals, it is important for those who control the passage of public 
policy to convince the public that the problems they are attending to are important and 
legitimate. Government officials often focus on indicators within society to demonstrate 
the existence of a particular problem (Kingdon, 2003, 95). There are several ways that 
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this can be done. Problems can be represented by numerical indicators such as statistics 
and measurements that can demonstrate pervasive issues that exist such as the cost of an 
out of control government budget or declining literacy rates among adults (Stone, 1997, 
163; Kingdon, 2003, 98).   
 Focusing events are another indicator that can help define a problem or focus 
attention on a particular issue. These events are often sudden and dramatic events that 
grab the attention of the public and government officials. Often these take the form of 
natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, floods) or large man made accidents (e.g., oil spills or 
plane crashes). They can also be more subtle events that politicians strategically frame to 
demonstrate what they consider to be a pressing problem (Birkland, 1997). These 
focusing events can be considered powerful symbols that people argue represent a larger 
more pervasive problem that exists within society and must be addressed immediately 
(Kingdon, 2003, 102). Often focusing events need to be supplemented by other indicators 
in order to help promote them to formal agenda prominence. This can include additional 
numerical indicators, other symbols, a preexisting perception among the public, or 
feedback from previous policy related to the issue. Most of the time though, it is not just 
the construction and recognition of a problem that propels an issue to the formal agenda. 
Often it takes the combination of problem definition and recognition from several other 
political forces to create the conditions necessary for an issue to reach the formal agenda. 
Understanding the influence of each of these political forces is important to understand 




The Politics Stream 
 Public opinion.  
 Public opinion refers to the conglomeration of public sentiments relating to a 
particular issue in a given jurisdiction (Converse, 1987). Due to our idealistic conceptions 
of a republican democracy in which representatives are elected to reflect the opinions and 
wishes of their constituencies, it would be normatively pleasing to find that public 
opinion is an important factor influencing what issues appear on the formal agenda. 
Scholars argue that there exists a large degree of congruence between policy and public 
opinion but they are unsure how one influences the other (Verba & Nie, 1972; Page & 
Shapiro, 1983). A plethora of literature points to the influence of public opinion on 
changes in public policy (Downs, 1957; Page & Shapiro, 1983; Dahl, 1989). Studies have 
shown that changes in public opinion in many cases precipitate policy changes and that 
legislatures largely respond to those pervasive changes in the public (Stimson, MacKuen, 
& Erikson, 1995). Scholars claim that public opinion has a greater effect on policy where 
morality issues are concerned due to the fact that they are both “easy” issues (e.g. morally 
right vs. morally wrong) and politically salient among the public (Carmines & Stimson, 
1980; Gormley, 1986; Haider-Markel & Meier, 1996; Haider-Markel, 1999; Mooney, 
1999; Norrander & Wilcox, 1999). Issues about the LGBT community are often framed 
as morality issues and therefore may be more influenced by public opinion.  
 There is mixed evidence though about the degree to which public opinion truly 
affects the policy process. Several scholars argue that politicians and policies are actually 
affecting public opinion, rather than the other way around (Key, 1961; Mill, 1962; 
Manza, Cook, & Page, 2002). Because the public is largely uneducated about issues or 
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has little time to concern itself with them, especially those that are complex, politicians 
may give cues to ordinary citizens that can help them construct their own opinions on 
issues. In the agenda setting process, while it is important that some segment of the 
public believes a problem exists, which can be alleviated by governmental action, often 
the public may be retroactively legitimating the actions of government.  
 The studies above largely reflect the relationship between public opinion and the 
policy as enacted into law. Agenda setting is a part of the process of any successfully 
enacted policy and hence there may be some connection between public opinion and the 
agenda. Soule and King (2006) argue that public opinion has very little impact on the 
beginning stages of the policy process, including agenda setting for two reasons. First, 
because public opinion may be the result of policy change itself, the processes leading up 
to policy enactment would not be affected by the public. Secondly, the earlier stages of 
public policy are less consequential for policy makers in terms of reputation, so 
representatives will not be overly concerned with public opinion until the final stages of 
the policy process (Soule & King, 2006). When representatives vote, the public is able to 
hold representatives accountable for that vote. As rational actors seeking re-election, 
public opinion will be a major determining factor in the way they choose to vote, not in 
what issues they choose to address.  
 Electoral forces.  
 Campaigns and elections undoubtedly play a large role in both the changes in 
institutional makeup of government and the actions of individuals in government, which 
in turn may have a significant impact on the agenda.  During an election year, those up 
for re-election will be focused on their reputations and the likelihood of being elected 
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back into office (Mayhew, 1974). There may be more pressure to vote along party lines 
or vote with the pervasive consensus among the public in order to guarantee a favorable 
spotlight around election time. This may mean the strategic introduction of an issue on to 
the agenda by both incumbents and new candidates in order to amass support among 
constituents. Candidates can introduce topics to the election agenda that are of their 
party’s strong suit, helping to amass further support (Abbe, Goodliffe, Herrnson, & 
Patterson, 2003). Incumbents can also make strategic moves to pressure an opposing 
party by putting legislation on the agenda that may have detrimental effects for the other 
party (Sulkin, 2005). Election years also have higher levels of media coverage which will 
have an effect on the election agenda, potentially influencing the make up of the formal 
agenda once new politicians have been elected to office (Shaw, 1999). While these 
dynamics may be complicated, understanding what was happening during that election 
year can show why some issues attained agenda status while others did not.  
 After elections take place, the turnover of government representatives can have an 
immediate impact on the agenda. This turnover will open up opportunities for new actors 
to contribute to the agenda and may give control of the agenda to a new party. A drastic 
change in partisanship within Congress or the White House may have profound effects on 
the make-up of the agenda, as the different parties will use the agenda to their own 
advantage. This may mean that new issue items arrive on the formal agenda, while others 
that may have been considered only months prior will be quickly swept off the list of 
agenda items. An example of the effects of legislative turnover occurred after the election 
of 1964, which saw a dramatic change in the make-up of Congress, giving Lyndon B. 
Johnson the opportunity to bring new issue items to the agenda and enact his Great 
35 
Society programs which were unprecedented in both issue and scope (Kingdon, 2003, 
101).  
Participants 
 Several different actors can have an instrumental role in the process of agenda 
setting. People are ultimately responsible for the policy making process and hence are 
influential at all stages of policymaking by constructing and defining issues, creating 
policy alternatives, and attempting to propel or block government actions. The public 
policy literature highlights a plethora of actors who can influence the process. 
 Policy entrepreneurs.  
 Many scholars of public policy discuss the importance of certain people who 
advocate for a particular policy or institutional attention to a particular issue. These actors 
are considered policy entrepreneurs who invest their resources including time, energy, 
and money to advocate their goals (Kingdon, 2003, 129).  Policy entrepreneurs can be a 
single person or group of people that exist within or outside of government to promote a 
particular issue. Because these people need certain skills to practically advance their 
goals, policy entrepreneurs are often people who have some access to the political arena 
and certain negotiating skills and wherewithal of political timing to promote an issue or 
policy (Zahariadis, 2007, 74). Those most skilled policy entrepreneurs are able to 
dominate the process of issue definition and policy proposal by understanding which 
tactics will be most successful (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009, 29). This limits most policy 
entrepreneurs to government officials, policy specialists, interest group members, and 
other similar political actors. Policy entrepreneurs often have particular goals in mind 
when they try to advance policy. Some may seek change in government policy in pursuit 
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of altruistic goals; others use their skills to advance their own interests including 
promotions and re-election.  
 A particular type of policy entrepreneur that may be relevant to the discussion of 
agenda setting in the case of same-sex marriage and the Defense of Marriage Act is a 
moral entrepreneur. These entrepreneurs promote a moral agenda that attempts to define 
what is socially acceptable and what is deviant (Becker, 1963). Social construction policy 
scholars argue that moral entrepreneurs use their access and influence, as they normally 
reside in dominant institutions such as churches and government, to construct or reinforce 
public perceptions of a group that they proscribe as deviant and then use these frames to 
promote a particular policy agenda (Ingram, Schneider, & deLeon, 2007, 108).   
 Intergovernmental actors.  
 Public policy literature, especially literature that focuses on federal legislation, 
must explore the actors within government that are undeniably influential in the 
formation of policy. Intergovernmental actors such as the courts, Congress, the President, 
and the bureaucracy are instrumental in the creation of both the systemic and formal 
agendas and are hence some of the most important aspects when examining the agenda 
setting process. Policymakers have control over the construction of the formal agenda 
and are a force to be reckoned with when it comes to agenda setting.  Policy makers have 
an interest in keeping certain things on the agenda and leaving certain things off, making 
the construction of the formal agenda a contested political process (Cobb & Elder, 1972). 
Groups outside of government must be able to obtain access to these actors in order to 
stand a chance of getting their issues placed on the formal agenda for consideration. The 
emergence of same-sex marriage onto the formal agenda of Congress in 1996 requires 
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looking at two intergovernmental actors that are key to understanding the issue’s agenda 
access: Congress and the President.  
 Congressional representatives. 
 Understanding the process of agenda setting would be incomplete without 
examining the role that the legislative branch plays in constructing the agenda. Many 
argue that Congress is integral in the agenda setting process (Kingdon, 2003; 
Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). Members of Congress are responsible for filtering through 
the issues that different actors argue are important government issues and ultimately 
decide which issues will be present on the formal agenda. This does not mean that they 
have complete and uninhibited control of the agenda as pressure from several different 
powerful actors can greatly influence what issues will be agenda issues. Members of 
Congress do however have the legal authority to craft public policy and have several 
reasons to actively participate in the agenda setting process. Because representatives are 
elected, they have some responsibility to represent their constituencies by listening to 
their demands or following up on campaign promises. By introducing a new policy or 
crusading for a favorable district policy, a representative can help assure a good 
reputation with his or her constituency that can help in future elections (Arnold, 1990). 
Representatives also may pursue an active role in agenda setting to show others in the 
political community that they are a force to be reckoned with (Kingdon, 2003, 42). 
Introducing an important piece of legislation that becomes law can help enhance a 
representative’s reputation. A representative may enter the agenda setting process in 
order to promote a policy that the representative sees as important and worthwhile 
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(Fenno, 1973). With access to the agenda, representatives may see their time in office as 
an opportunity to create change in line with their policy values.  
 Congressional committees in particular may have a substantial effect on the 
formal agenda of Congress as these committees are responsible for the legislation that 
will reported out of committee and on to the floor of the House or Senate for deliberation. 
Committees have the formal authority to construct the issues of a particular area of 
specialization that will be debated by the larger body of Congress and hence have a great 
degree of control in etching out the parameters of issue importance (Sinclair, 1986).  
  It is difficult though to assess to what degree Congress impacts the agenda setting 
process because there are so many actors, both known and hidden that affect what gets on 
the agenda. Congress is made up of hundreds of actors each with his or her own unique 
interests and agenda, making it difficult to follow how issues arrive on the formal agenda 
(Kingdon, 2003, 34). Interest groups, the president, think tanks, and different actors 
within government institutions all attempt to exert their own influence on the system as 
well. It is critical to understand how these other actors interact with members of Congress 
and the institution itself to capture the relationships or coalitions that exist to propel 
issues onto the agenda.  
 The president. 
 The president, due to his position within the branches of government, is an 
important political force, if not the most important, in the process of agenda setting 
(Huntington, 1965; Moe & Teel, 1970; Kingdon, 2003; Baumgartner & Jones, 2009). The 
president has the ability to single handedly set the agenda by pushing his policy agenda 
onto the other branches of government, particularly Congress and the bureaucracy. The 
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president exerts substantial control of the agenda for several reasons. The president has 
decisive and unitary control over the executive branch and can more easily fashion a 
policy agenda, relative to the other branches of government (Neustadt, 1991; Kingdon, 
2003, 24-25). Another institutional resource for the president is the advantage of prestige 
of office, which gives him several advantages over Congress in the agenda setting 
process. The president is able to command greater media coverage and public attention, 
giving him the unique ability to communicate his ideas and positions to the public 
(Kernell, 2007). The State of the Union address is an example of one of the many tools 
the president has to communicate his agenda ideas to the public. If the president enjoys a 
great degree of popularity among the public or other institutional leaders, he has the 
capacity to exert influence on the process of agenda setting. This is especially true in 
times of unified government when the President is able to make meaningful connections 
with many of the leaders in Congress who share the same party affiliation (Kingdon, 
2003, 25).  
 While the president has a great deal of resources to influence the process of issue 
definition and agenda setting, the president does not have as much control over the 
outcomes of the agenda setting process. While he may be able to define what issues will 
be a part of the formal agenda, he loses a significant degree of power in the formation of 
policy and the outcomes that will arrive at his desk to be signed into law. This means that 
the President has the greatest degree of control at the beginning stages of agenda setting 
and slowly loses that advantage once an issue has reached the formal agenda (Kingdon, 
2003, 23).  
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 Organized interests. 
 Organized interests have been integral throughout American history in the process 
of interest articulation. Different conglomerates of citizens for different purposes have 
organized themselves in order to coordinate efforts to influence the policy making 
process by entering the political debate over both issues and policy. While these groups 
have come in several different forms, most have been formed for the same particular 
reason: influence on the processes and outcomes of government. Interest groups and 
social movements, two of the most prominent organized political forces, will be 
examined in this study. Interest groups “refer to any group that, on the basis of one or 
more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in society for the 
establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by 
those shared attitudes” (Truman, 1951, 204). Truman included all interest groups, both 
potential and institutionalized. He argued that interest groups would become political 
once that group attempts to influence government to advocate those desired claims 
(Truman, 1951; Walker, 1991). Interest groups simultaneously have been hailed for their 
ability to effectively represent citizens in government, while at the same time have been 
despised for their ability to control politics in favor of an elite model of pluralism. 
Whether normatively appealing or displeasing, interest groups have had an influence on 
the agenda setting process and the passage of policy.  
 Interest groups are able to influence the policy making process, particularly the 
agenda setting process with a variety of lobbying tactics. Interest groups can focus on 
several different institutions but the majority of efforts to affect the agenda setting 
process are done through legislative lobbying tactics. An interest group’s most powerful 
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weapon is its ability to provide expertise on issues to help members of Congress 
understand and make decisions on complex topics (Leyden, 1992; Wright, 1996). This 
can be done by testifying in congressional committees or by contacting individuals within 
Congress to try to sway their votes. These groups can also use grassroots strategies 
during the agenda setting process to foster awareness among the public and mobilize 
constituents to contact representatives (Wright, 1996). Public relations campaigns and 
media advertising can help increase awareness about an issue among the public. Interest 
groups also attempt to engage the public for later electoral mobilization.  
 In contrast, a social movement can be defined as  
 a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a 
change in society or organization of which it is part. As a 
collectivity, a movement is a group with indefinite and shifting 
membership and with leadership whose position is determined 
more by informal response of adherents than by formal procedures 
of legitimizing authority. (Turner & Killian, 1987, 223) 
 
A social movement is often a collectivity of multiple actors, both organizations and 
individuals, that informally works to promote or resist social change in congruence with 
that movement’s collective beliefs and values. This more amorphous and diffuse form of 
political organization will utilize both the formal access points of government along with 
other non-traditional tactics outside of established government channels to influence 
social change. Social movements are able to influence government via two important 
mechanisms (Andrews, 2001; Soule, 2004). Social movements, like other organized 
interests, are able to help shape the agenda setting process by drawing attention to issues 
with new frames and information that can help attract attention to an issue previously 
discarded or neglected from the agenda (King, Bentele, & Soule, 2007, 142). They also 
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can threaten political elites by using disruptive tactics to put pressure on policymakers to 
act in their favor (Piven & Cloward, 1977; King, Bentele, & Soule, 2007).  
 The proliferation of organized groups, both interest groups and social movements, 
in the 1960s brought about dramatic changes in the arena of policy making (Sinclair, 
1989). Policymaking debates would be moved from stable subgovernments of tightly knit 
groups of organized interests and government officials, in many cases classified as iron 
triangles, to more diffuse conglomerates of issue networks. These issue networks allow 
for more participation among a wide variety of groups and actors that specialize in a 
particular area (Berry, 1993, 34).  This participation has also made policymaking a much 
more contentious and conflictual process as more people with more opinions continue to 
flood the policymaking process (Heclo, 1979; Wright, 1996). It also has an affect on the 
agenda. The proliferation of interest groups and the expanding size of government have 
made the systemic agenda larger and the space for formal agenda items appears smaller 
(Coughlin, Mueller, & Murrell, 1990). Interest groups seeking to get their issues on the 
formal agenda must use valuable resources to compete to secure formal agenda 
recognition.  
 The states.  
 When examining the agenda setting process in the federal government, it is 
important to understand the role that the states may play in the development of the 
agenda. The states are not complacent actors in a hierarchical system taking orders from 
above. Each state has its own agency and its own dynamics within the U.S. federal 
system, giving states the opportunity to develop new policy. Some scholars argue that 
issues and policy initiatives can spread from one state to another by a process of diffusion 
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(Walker, 1969; Rogers, 1983; Berry & Berry, 1990; Berry & Baybeck, 2005). Scholars 
define diffusion as “the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain 
channels over time among the members of a social system” (Rogers, 1983, 5). Diffusion 
models of the states conceptualize the states as a social system that communicates new 
policy issues and policy ideas based on several different methods of diffusion. This 
diffusion can happen based on geographical closeness, similar political, social, and 
economic state characteristics, or hierarchically (Berry & Berry, 1990; Mintrom, 1997; 
Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, & Peterson, 2004). A successful program in one state or a 
sudden concern for an issue in one state can prompt other states to take action as well. 
 The literature on diffusion also examines the role that the national government 
plays as a superior “state” that is able to influence the issues and policies of other states 
(Welch & Thompson, 1980; Berry & Berry, 2007; McCann, Shipan, & Volden, 2010). 
Less literature exists on how the states can influence the agenda of the national 
government (Boeckelman, 1992; Mossberger, 1999; Karch, 2007; Weissert & Scheller, 
2008). If several states begin to put specific issues on the agenda, it is likely that the 
national government will take notice, although studies find that the influence of state 
policy on the federal government is limited (Boeckelman, 1992; Thompson & Burke, 
2007)    
 The media.  
 The media, as a communication channel between the distant workings of 
government and the people, must be considered a part of the agenda setting process. The 
media is not an unbiased, neutral entity but is instead a business that strategically 
maneuvers to attract viewers with interesting and attractive stories. Because the media is 
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manipulative in its dissemination of stories, it is important to determine if this 
manipulation influences the formal agendas of government. Several studies have 
explored the agenda setting function of the mass media focusing primarily on the media’s 
effects on the public’s issue and policy priorities (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; McLeod, 
Becker, & Byrnes, 1974; Cook, Tyler, Goetz, Gordon, Protess, Leff, & Molotch, 1983; 
McCombs, 2006). Because the public’s attention to issues stems from its exposure to 
them, the media should influence how the public views issues (Page & Shapiro, 1992). 
Studies have found inconclusively that the media does exhibit an agenda setting capacity 
(Cook et al., 1983; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; MacKuen & Coombs, 1981). This media 
agenda setting theory argues that the media’s strategic reporting of issues will influence 
the way the public views the importance of particular issues (Cook et al., 1983). The 
media can do this by highlighting an issue with increased media exposure, such as lead 
story status (Behr & Iyengar, 1985).  
 While this is important research in itself, there is an implied assumption that the 
mass media’s influence on the public will in turn lead to changes in the formal agendas of 
government. As was mentioned earlier, it is unclear how public opinion influences the 
agenda, and so it is important to also understand how the media shapes the agenda 
through the influence of other actors, primarily government actors who are responsible 
for the construction of the formal agenda. Some studies find that the media does affect 
government decision makers, which can be done by drawing their attention to a shift in 
the public’s issue priorities influencing a government official’s perception of an issue’s 
salience (Rogers & Dearing, 1994; Cook et al., 1983).  Others argue the media has a 
minimal, if any effect on policy makers (Kingdon, 2003).  Because the media is often 
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reporting on issues that the government is addressing, it is difficult for the media to focus 
policy makers’ attention on an issue before they have already noticed it (Kingdon, 2003). 
The media’s emphasis on dramatic issues that will increase viewership also mediates any 
effect that the media might have because issues on the agenda will quickly wane in media 
attractiveness causing attention to be intense but short-lived (Downs, 1972).  
 The previous literature on agenda setting and the factors that influence the process 
will be instrumental in the construction of the research design and analysis of the data for 
this study. Using Kingdon’s Multiple Streams framework, the following chapters will 
evaluate the effect of each of these variables on the agenda setting process for the issue of 
same-sex marriage, as the issue transcends the politics of Hawaii and moves into the halls 





























 This paper seeks to answer the following question: Does the litigation in Hawaii 
over same-sex marriage prompt congressional action that results in the Defense of 
Marriage Act? If so, why does the litigation catalyze congressional action? The research 
will also address three additional research questions that will help answer if and/or why 
the litigation in Hawaii results in DOMA. These questions are as follows. How is the 
problem of same-sex marriage conceptualized and framed? Who is responsible for 
putting same-sex marriage on the congressional agenda and to what extent is each force 
in the politics stream responsible for DOMA’s agenda status?  These questions were 
guided by Kingdon’s multiple streams framework to help organize the data theoretically 
and conceptually. The question of problem conceptualization and framing encompasses 
the problem stream, while the questions pertaining to the influence of political forces and 
participants involved in the process of agenda setting relate to the political stream. 
Kingdon’s framework will be used as a theoretical tool to help answer these research 
questions.  
 To answer the question of whether or not the activity in Hawaii over same-sex 
marriage prompts congressional action that results in the Defense of Marriage Act, I 
employ a historical case study analysis to examine the events, forces, and participants 
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responsible for the elevation of same-sex marriage to the national agenda. Historical 
analysis can be used to obtain knowledge about previously unexamined historical events 
and can help establish patterns and possible cause and effect relationships (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2011, 184). It is used in this study to develop an in-depth look at processes and 
phenomena that may not have been previously articulated or described accurately 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2011, 91). This method of analysis is grounded in a larger 
qualitative methodology that is best at capturing the complex dynamics involved in the 
process of agenda setting to highlight the important variables that can explain the cause 
of same-sex marriage’s movement to Congress’s formal agenda (McNabb, 2004, 344). A 
mixture of qualitative and quantitative content analysis will be used in this study to focus 
on quantifying important patterns and exploring “the presence, meanings, and 
relationships of… words and concepts, and then make inferences about the messages” 
(Busch et al., 2005).  
 This research expects to find that the events in Hawaii are integral to the 
definition of the problem of same-sex marriage and its place on the formal agenda of 
Congress. Because the media and political elites at the time of the introduction of the 
Defense of Marriage Act, along with several scholars, cite Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 530; 
852 P.2d 44; 1993) as the impetus for congressional action, I would expect to find that 
the data largely conforms to this hypothesis.  
 The dependent variable for this study will be the introduction of the Defense of 
Marriage Act onto the formal agenda of Congress, which represents same-sex marriage’s 
introduction to federal politics. Several variables will be examined to understand their 
influence on same-sex marriage’s national agenda status. All, with the exception of the 
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state variable, have been derived from Kingdon’s theoretical model. Variables are 
included in this study that Kingdon found to exert little to no influence on the agenda 
setting process.  The following will explain how each of the research questions will be 
answered. This will include the operationalization of each variable, the sources used to 
evaluate their influence, and the justification for examining each variable in the context 
of this study.  
How is the problem of same-sex marriage conceptualized and framed? 
 
 The first question informs the larger research question addressed in this study by 
specifically examining how the litigation in Hawaii connects to the definition of the 
problem of same-sex marriage. To understand how an issue is defined or framed, two 
criteria must be assessed: selection and salience (Entman, 1993). This involves 
examining the selection of “some aspects of a perceived reality” with an attempt to make 
them “more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993, 52). Evaluating the selection and 
salience of frames can help us understand how the problem of same-sex marriage is 
rhetorically constructed and how Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44; 1993) is 
connected to this definition. These frames can help capture the influence that the 
litigation in Hawaii had on the elevation of same-sex marriage to Congress’s agenda. The 
evaluation also can show the resilience of particular frames that represent the dominant 
conceptualization of the issue, illustrating the “winners” in the contestation of frames.  
 To capture how the issue of same-sex marriage is framed, a qualitative and 
quantitative content analysis was conducted on two congressional documents and 160 
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newspaper articles. The first, the congressional testimony from the House Subcommittee 
of the Constitution, documents the debate on H.R. 3396: The Defense of Marriage Act. 
This document contains relevant testimony from representatives, interest groups, and 
other interested parties about the appropriateness, legality, and necessity of the bill. The 
other document is the House Judiciary Committee’s Report with Dissenting Views that 
accompanied the bill when it was voted out of committee and onto the House floor. This 
document summarizes some of the testimony but also gives rationales for the bill and 
contains the opposition’s arguments against the bill. Both documents capture extensive 
dialogue by several political elites in the battle over same-sex marriage’s issue definition, 
making both valuable to understand how same-sex marriage is defined and framed. 
Committee documents are also most fruitful for this study because committees are the 
place where the most debate takes place within Congress about an issue, making them 
best able to capture discussions about problem definition.   
  Newspaper articles were obtained from Lexis Nexis. A key word search on Lexis 
Nexis for relevant newspaper articles between January 1990 and December 1996 was 
done for three separate terms: “same-sex marriage,” “gay marriage,” and “The Defense of 
Marriage Act.” The search sought to reveal all newspaper articles that referenced “same-
sex marriage” or “gay marriage” prior to December 31, 1996, when the Defense of 
Marriage Act had been signed into law and the decision in Baehr v. Miike (1996 WL 
694235, Hawaii Cir.Ct.) had been handed down by the First Circuit Court. This was done 
to capture the saliency of the issue of same-sex marriage during the debate over the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act but was also done to assess earlier frames about same-
sex marriage. The key word phrases were chosen to capture the problem definition of 
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same-sex marriage and gay marriage, two common terms used to articulate marriage 
between people of the same sex. The phrase “The Defense of Marriage Act” was used, as 
its introduction to Congress’s agenda is the dependent variable of this study. Gathering 
articles on the Defense of Marriage Act also could help draw a comparison between the 
congressional documents and the media’s portrayal of those discussions.  
 The search results for the phrase “same sex marriage” revealed 53 news articles 
within the specified time period. “Gay marriage” reported 16 relevant news articles and 
“The Defense of Marriage Act” reported 251 articles. In order to make these news 
articles manageable, every other news article from each phrase was used, cutting the 
number of news articles in half to 160. This was done to make the data set more 
manageable while still keeping the data temporally relevant. News articles were used 
from a variety of domestic newspapers (61 in total) across the country to capture the 
reporting of same-sex marriage from all geographic areas of the United States. This was 
done to ensure that no single area of the United States dominated the discussion about the 
events. It was also done in order to amass enough articles to ensure reliability of the data. 
Newspapers were used in the analysis to capture the contestation of arguments about 
same-sex marriage. Evaluating newspapers can help capture the salience of frames used 
by elites and can highlight temporal variation of those frames.   
 These sources were coded openly to establish the varied conceptualizations of the 
problem of same-sex marriage. This open coding method allowed me to thoroughly 
capture all of the relevant frames so that categories were exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive (Guba, 1978; Patton, 2001, 453; Marshall & Rossman, 2011, 214). Seventeen 
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frames were derived from this open coding and applied in a second reading to the 
documents (Table 4.1). 
                                             Table 4.1  
Frames  
Children Justice 
Diversity Love  
Economy Morality 
Election Nature  
Equality Religion 
Family Rights  
Freedom State’s Rights 
Intolerance Tradition 
Judges   
 
 Data was recorded for the number of times that same-sex marriage was defined 
using one of these frames. If a sentence had one frame, it was coded with that frame. If a 
sentence made reference to multiple frames, each of those frames was accounted for. The 
total count for each frame includes arguments made by both proponents and opponents of 
same-sex marriage. This means that when opponents of same-sex marriage claim that 
same-sex marriage will be destabilizing and detrimental to the family unit and proponents 
of same-sex marriage claim that same-sex marriage will not be detrimental but instead 
will help strengthen the family, both will be coded as a family frame. The sources were 
coded in this manner because while both argue opposite points, one is refuting the other’s 
use of the same frame. A frame is determined a dominant frame of either the proponents 
or opponents of same-sex marriage if it is used primarily by one coalition. To clarify, the 
proponents will be considered the coalition of interest groups and elite actors that favor 
same-sex marriage. The opponents will be the coalition of interest groups and elite actors 
that oppose same-sex marriage. These frames were analyzed quantitatively to pick up the 
resonance of dominant frames. The frames were also analyzed qualitatively to examine 
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trends and patterns in the study. One inter-coder reliability test was done on 5 newspaper 
articles “to check for consistency of meaning and application” in the codes (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2011, 221). The coder was able to recode 91% of the data accurately.  
 An examination of the influence of Hawaii’s litigation was also done in this part 
of the study.  The study documents the number of times Hawaii is mentioned in 
connection with the Defense of Marriage Act. This was done by coding for all of the 
times that Hawaii was mentioned in newspaper articles that contain the phrase “The 
Defense of Marriage Act.” The codes “state’s rights” and “judicial activism” were used to 
depict the specific procedural issues that define the problem of same-sex marriage in 
relation to the litigation in Hawaii. These indicators will measure the degree to which the 
litigation in Hawaii is perceived as a focusing event that draws national attention to the 
issue of same-sex marriage and helps propel it to the congressional agenda. The only way 
to truly measure the influence that the litigation in Hawaii has on the congressional 
agenda will involve a qualitative analysis that interprets all of the other relevant variables 
to assess the degree to which the political activity in Hawaii is actually a major factor in 
the nationalization of same-sex marriage.  
To what extent is each force in the politics stream responsible for DOMA’s agenda 
status? 
 The second question that helps answer the overarching research question 
addresses the influences of forces in the political stream that contribute to the creation of 
DOMA. While actors are essential to the movement of an issue onto the agenda, these 
forces constrain the actions of these political elites, structuring the decisions they make 
and their ability to strategically maneuver to achieve their ends. These forces can also be 
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used or manipulated to an actor’s advantage to help propel an issue onto the formal 
agenda. The following variables will be assessed in this section: public opinion, electoral 
forces, and partisanship.  
 Public opinion poll data will be used from three polling entities: The Pew 
Research Center, Gallup, and Newsweek. All of these polls ask the public whether same-
sex marriage should or should not legal. These polls were taken between March and May 
of 1996, capturing the public sentiment before and after the Defense of Marriage Act was 
introduced to Congress. This data is used to assess the national mood about same-sex 
marriage when the Defense of Marriage was introduced which has the potential to 
constrain the actions of elected officials.  
 Because 1996 is a presidential election year, it is important to assess the influence 
that the upcoming elections and campaigns have on same-sex marriage’s movement to 
Congress’s agenda. The electoral forces that play on the actors will be measured by the 
number of times the congressional documents or newspaper articles reference the 
upcoming election. This number will establish the salience of the election year forces 
embedded in the discussions of the Defense of Marriage Act. The prevalence of election 
references will point to influence of electoral factors on the trajectory of the legislation. 
Election year forces will also be assessed by examining the party platforms of both the 
Democratic and Republican Party. This will establish the issue salience in each 
document. The partisan forces will be measured by coding the cosponsors and votes of 




Who is responsible for putting same-sex marriage on the congressional agenda? 
 The last question addresses who is responsible for elevating same-sex marriage to 
the formal agenda. This question is important to address, as agency is central to 
understanding how same-sex marriage ends up on the national agenda. Certain actors, 
often policy entrepreneurs who are interested in promoting a particular issue, will use 
their resources to promote issue salience and establish an issue such as same-sex 
marriage on the formal agenda. To understand how we get from Hawaii to DOMA, we 
must understand who helped move the issue of same-sex marriage from one venue to 
another. This question will be answered by understanding the relative influence of 
congressional representatives, the president, the states, the media, and interest group 
coalitions on the agenda status of same-sex marriage. 
 Congressional representatives are undoubtedly central to answering the question 
of how same-sex marriage arrived onto Congress’s formal agenda. These representatives 
were responsible for drafting, sponsoring, debating, and passing the Defense of Marriage 
Act, which ultimately expands the controversy of the same-sex marriage from state 
institutions to the federal government. It is difficult to measure or quantify the influence 
of these actors because of their central role in this process. It is difficult to remove the 
representatives from the discussion of the Defense of Marriage Act to evaluate their 
influence, as the body of Congress is integral to the Defense of Marriage Act’s existence. 
It is also difficult to measure due to the fact that several other factors including public 
opinion, electoral forces, and organized interests influence the actions of congressional 
representatives, making it difficult to disentangle the discussion of congressional 
influence from these other factors. The influence of these actors will be evaluated based 
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on the saliency of the issue in Congress by examining the cosponsors of the legislation 
and the number of hearings on the bill. These indicators can help show the levels of 
support for the bill and same-sex marriages place on Congress’s agenda. While this can 
only capture part of Congress’s influence, a qualitative assessment will also be given to 
understand how Congress and the actors in Congress contribute to the nationalization of 
same-sex marriage.  
 Measuring the influence of the president on the agenda is also difficult to assess, 
as the existence of the president in the agenda setting process does not necessarily 
correlate to influence. This study will examine the party identifications of Congress and 
the president, the shared policy preferences or lack there of between the Congress and the 
president, and the level of presidential popularity. All will be used to assess the degree to 
which the president influences the agenda. Party affiliations will be measured by the 
partisan distributions in Congress compared to the President’s party identification to 
assess the degree to which party identification is shared. This data will be gathered from 
the House and Senate website archives on previous sessions of Congress. This can help 
measure the degree to which the president can influence the agenda by utilizing party 
allies in Congress. Shared policy preferences will be examined by a qualitative content 
analysis of statements made by the President to assess his position on the issue and 
compare it to the preferences of Congress to assess whether the President could seek out 
allies that had a similar position on the issue. Presidential popularity, measured by Gallup 
polls on approval ratings can help show the degree to which the President can set the 
agenda with his public prestige and popularity in government. These indicators will be 
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assessed in light of the other variables to determine the degree to which the President was 
able to influence the elevation of same-sex marriage to the formal agenda.  
 The states’ influence is not included in Kingdon’s, framework, which is a 
limitation of the framework. Because marriage has traditionally been a state issue, it is 
necessary to assess the activity at the state level, as these states can have a powerful 
influence on the national government.  Operationalizing the influence of the states will 
include an examination of the legislative activity in the states focusing on the 
introduction and passage of mini DOMAs or state “Defense of Marriage Acts” in 1996. 
The existence of introduced and passed state legislation prior to the introduction of the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act will demonstrate the degree to which the states were the 
first actors to act on the issue of recognizing same-sex marriages, which may be a proxy 
for influence at the national level.  
 The influence of organized interests will be measured by a variety of indicators to 
try and triangulate all possible proxy indicators of influence. Due to the breadth of this 
study, this research will not assess the individual influence of particular interest groups 
but will assess holistically the degree to which larger coalitions of proponent interest 
groups and opponent interest groups influence the elevation of same-sex marriage. It is 
difficult to collect data on interest group strategies that can help assess influence due to 
the fact that this study covers a vast geographical expanse over a period of time. 
Lobbying strategies, such as meeting with individual representatives, are also difficult to 
measure, as there are often no accessible records of these meetings. 
  The salience of interest groups throughout the data sources can help establish the 
degree to which certain interest group coalitions were present in the process, which can 
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have some correlation to influence on the process. This will be measured by coding for 
all interest groups mentioned in the newspapers and congressional documents. Interest 
groups were coded as either proponents of same-sex marriage or opponents of same-sex 
marriage and quantified based on the number of times they appear within the documents. 
Data was also collected from other sources including newspaper articles and books about 
events in Hawaii and DOMA to measure interest group influence based on the tactics 
used. This data can capture those interest groups that testified in Congress, directly 
lobbied representatives, and used a variety of grassroots mobilization strategies. In the 
same way, previous research on the influence of interest groups at the state level on the 
issue of same-sex marriage was evaluated (Haider-Markel, 2001). The frames that define 
the problem of same-sex marriage were also used to capture interest group influence as 
dominant frames in the discussion of same-sex marriage and DOMA can help capture 
those salient themes that were perpetuated by interest group coalitions. Together these 
indicators were analyzed and interpreted to assess the degree to which interest group 
coalitions influence the introduction of DOMA to Congress.  
 The influence of the media was qualitatively assessed based on the timing of 
events and the media’s reporting of same-sex marriage and the Defense of Marriage Act 
more generally. If the media was influential in setting the systemic or formal agenda on 
this issue, the reporting on the issue of same-sex marriage would predate the introduction 
of the federal Defense of Marriage Act. If most of the articles were created after the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act, this is one indicator that the media is following the lead 
of political elites. The newspaper articles were also qualitatively analyzed to examine the 
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degree to which new information is presented in the articles, as opposed to a reiteration of 
dialogue of other political elites.  
 Once all of the data was collected and measured, the variables were assessed in 
line with the original research questions. Understanding how the issue is framed, the 
actors involved, and the political forces present helped answer the overarching question 
of the research study: Does the litigation in Hawaii lead to the emergence of the Defense 
of Marriage Act on the congressional agenda and if so why? This was done through a 
qualitative assessment of the data. Analytic themes emerged connecting the variables and 
these connections were assessed.  From my analysis of the data, I have offered some 
interpretations of my findings that “bring meaning and coherence to the themes, patterns, 
and categories by developing linkages and a storyline” (Marshall & Rossman, 2011, 
219). 
 While this study does try to pinpoint the variables responsible for the elevation of 
same-sex marriage to Congress’s formal agenda, this paper does not try to establish 
causality. Kingdon acknowledges that his theory is designed to capture the process of 
agenda setting but does not try to create casual links or establish casual mechanisms, as it 
is likely that several variables are responsible for an issue’s emergence onto the formal 
agenda. Because this is a case study, the findings are also not generalizable and can only 
be useful to describe and explain this phenomenon more clearly. The following chapter 

















 The following chapter will utilize the data collected and Kingdon’s multiple 
streams framework as a theoretical guide to answer the four questions proposed at the 
beginning of this research. To explain the very complicated phenomena in this study, this 
chapter will first answer the three sub questions that will help inform the overarching 
question in this study about the variables responsible for same-sex marriage’s movement 
to Congress’s formal agenda. After thoroughly answering these three questions, the last 
part of the chapter will use the findings to answer the question of whether or not the 
litigation in Hawaii is responsible for the congressional action on the issue of same-sex 
marriage.  
How is the problem of same-sex marriage conceptualized and framed? 
 An issue must be considered a problem worthy of government attention for it to 
make it to the formal agenda. As a result, the public and government officials must be 
convinced that an issue is a problem in order to move it onto the agenda. One must 
remember that problem definition is an interpretive and subjective process. Conditions 
exist throughout the world, but not all conditions are considered problems. The process 
by which a condition is transformed into a problem involves coordinated efforts to 
rhetorically and socially construct a problem so that people consider it an issue worthy of 
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government intervention (Kingdon, 2003). Same-sex marriage had been a topic of 
discussion prior to its movement onto the national systemic and formal agenda in 1996. 
The prior litigation in a few states in the 1970s and 1980s, a few minor actions by state 
governments, and discussions in interest group inner circles illustrate the existence of the 
issue prior to the initiation of Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44; 1993). These 
incidents did not garner substantial attention. While same-sex marriage may have been a 
political priority to some, it was not previously seen as a problem that the government 
must immediately address. Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44; 1993) on the other 
hand led to an eruption of government activity in response to the new problem of same-
sex marriage. 
 There is a consensus in the literature and amongst government officials involved 
in the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act that the litigation in Hawaii is considered 
the event that caused Congress to take up the issue of same-sex marriage with the 
introduction of the Defense of Marriage Act (H.R. 3396, 1996; Hull, 2001; Koppelman, 
2002). All of the reports and congressional testimony from Congress point to the 
litigation in Hawaii and the repercussion of the impending trial court decision in 1996 as 
the reason for the introduction and passage of DOMA (H.R. 3396, 1996; H.R. Rep. No. 
664, 1996).  One hundred thirty-seven of the 251 news articles (54%) from Lexis Nexis 
that reference the Defense of Marriage Act also mention the events in Hawaii, 
demonstrating a relationship between the two developments. Sixty-five percent of these 
articles explicitly reference the litigation in Hawaii as cause for DOMA’s consideration 
in Congress. Scholars also point to the litigation in Hawaii as a catalyst for subsequent 
activity surrounding same-sex marriage and relationship recognition, including DOMA 
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(Chambers, 2000; Feldblum, 2000; Hull, 2001; Goldberg-Hiller, 2002; Koppelman, 2002; 
Mezey, 2007). The following chapter will examine how same-sex marriage came to be 
defined as a problem that captured the attention of government officials. 
 The on-going litigation in Hawaii was the first to attract substantial national 
attention to the issue of same-sex marriage. The Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision to 
vacate and remand the trial back to the First Circuit Court signified a radical departure 
from previous court rulings. The Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision to classify the Hawaii 
marriage statute as a sex-based classification that warranted strict scrutiny gave the 
plaintiffs a substantial advantage in the trial. Putting the state in a position to prove a 
compelling state interest, with the prior assumption of unconstitutionality, made it likely 
that same-sex marriages would be legal for the first time in U.S. history.  
 While the decision in Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44; 1993) was 
monumental and if the litigation is responsible for the emergence of same-sex marriage 
onto the congressional agenda, the litigation itself could not move the issue of same-sex 
marriage from the events taking place thousands of miles from the mainland onto the 
formal agenda of Congress. Prior to the introduction of DOMA, very few states were 
dealing with the issue of same-sex marriage in the courts and only 26 of the 251 news 
articles discuss same-sex marriage or gay marriage prior to the introduction of DOMA 
(Hull, 2001). There was also no definitive decision from the Hawaii courts about the 
legality of same-sex marriage, making DOMA a largely preemptive measure on the part 
of Congress to a phenomenon that would not exist until several years later. The events in 
Hawaii needed to be constructed as a problem that was deserving of government 
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regulation, in order to foster pressure for the federal government, an institution that had 
not previously dealt with the issue of marriage, to address it. 
 An analysis of the frames used by the proponent and opponent coalitions to define 
the problem of same-sex marriage highlights the dominant frames that define same-sex 
marriage and the events in Hawaii. The distribution of frames from the congressional 
documents and newspapers are displayed in Table 5.1. Two dominant overarching 
themes emerged from the coding scheme. The frames that define same-sex marriage were 
either frames that defined the problem by alluding to the implications that would arise 
from the litigation in Hawaii or the frames defined the issue of same-sex marriage more 
generally. The following will analyze each of these overarching themes and the frames 
that constitute them to help answer the question of how same-sex marriage is 
conceptualized and framed.  
 Frames in relation to Hawaii’s litigation.  
 Ninety-three of the 660 frames coded in the study alluded to the problem in terms 
of the implications of the Hawaii litigation for the rest of the United States. Part of the 
problem with the legality of same-sex marriage in Hawaii would be the procedural 
implications stemming from the U.S. Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause that 
might “impose” same-sex marriage on other states. The state’s rights frame highlights 
this fear, as many in the opposition coalition argue that the states should have the right to 
decide whether or not to recognize same-sex marriage. Lynn Wardle, a professor at 
Brigham Young University who testified in front of the House Subcommittee on the 
Constitution sums up the state’s rights frame with the statement, “It is important that 
advocates of same-sex marriage, not be allowed to use federal conflicts law as a tool, as a 
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wedge, as a vehicle to force other states to recognize same-sex marriages and deprive 
those states of the right to make the decision themselves” (H.R. 3396, 1996). 
Table 5.1: Distribution of Same-Sex Marriage Frames  




Newspapers Total  
  
Morality  
Deviancy of gays and lesbians; 
Marriage is demeaned by allowing 
same-sex couples to marry.  57 76 133 
Tradition 
Protecting the traditional institution 
of marriage; Resist radical 
redefinition of marriage.  37 30 67 
State's 
Rights 
Force states to recognize 
marriages. 43 20 63 
Election  
Wedge issue, election year 
politicking 14 49 63 
Family 
Strengthening or erosion of the 
family unit.   21 36 57 
Intolerance 
Intolerance of others. 
Discrimination against a group.  17 34 51 
Right 
Marriage is a 
fundamental/civil/equal rights 
issue.  20 20 40 
Love 
Recognize relationships that are 
based on love.  23 12 35 
Judges 
Allowing unelected judges to 
determine policy.  25 5 30 
Religion 
Tying justifications to religious 
rhetoric.  8 19 27 
Children  
Children will/will not be harmed by 
having parents of the same sex.  13 11 24 
Equality 
Same-sex couples should be on the 
same footing as heterosexual 
couples. Equality of the law.  10 9 19 
Freedom 
Freedom to choose who to 
marry/Freedom to marry.  12 6 18 
Nature 
The naturalness of male and 
female couples based on biology.  8 5 13 
Economy 
Costs of including same-sex 
couples to receive the benefits of 
marriage.  5 2 7 
Justice 
Only fair or right to include same-
sex couples in the institution of 
marriage.  3 4 7 
Diversity Diversity strengthens society.  5 1 6 
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The judges frame also highlights another conceptualization of the problem as some argue 
that the judges in Hawaii are using undemocratic means to achieve their own agendas. 
Some in the opposition coalition blame the Hawaiian judges for the problem as they 
complain that, “three judges are about to determine the fate of perhaps the most 
stabilizing institution we have in this country” (H.R. 3396, 1996).  
 These frames that define the issue in terms of the Hawaii litigation only constitute 
14% of the frames in these documents.  This means that the legal developments in Hawaii 
and the repercussions of these court decisions were not the main frames used to define 
the problem of same-sex marriage. This low number is surprising given the fact that the 
Hawaii litigation is said to have caused Congress to take up the issue of same-sex 
marriage. If the issues with the Hawaii litigation (i.e. the states rights and judicial 
activism issues) are the reasons for the introduction of the Defense of Marriage Act, there 
ought to be substantially more references in the newspapers and congressional documents 
to the problems associated with the ruling in Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44; 
1993). Instead the other frames that represent arguments for and against same-sex 
marriage more generally are primarily responsible for the definition of the problem. 
 The remaining frames, 567 in total, are used to define the problem of same-sex 
marriage more generally. These frames capture both proponent coalition and opponent 
coalition frames that are used to define the issue in an attempt to create issue salience. 
Proponent coalition frames include love, freedom, rights, justice, equality, diversity and 
intolerance/discrimination. Opponent coalition frames include tradition, family, children, 
morality, economy, religion, and nature. The following will analyze the frames most 
frequently used by each coalition.  
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 Opponent coalition frames.  
 The most common frame utilized by the opponent coalition to define the problem 
of same-sex marriage is the morality frame. Over 20% of the frames used to define the 
issue were couched in value laden terms about same-sex marriage (see Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 Opposition Coalition Frames 
Frame Description of Frame  
Percentage of Total 
Frames  
Morality  
Deviancy of gays and lesbians; Marriage is 
demeaned by allowing same-sex couples to 
marry.  20.0% 
Tradition 
Protecting the traditional institution of 
marriage; Resist radical redefinition of 
marriage.  10.0% 
State's 
Rights Force states to recognize marriages. 9.5% 
Family Strengthening or erosion of the family unit.   8.6% 
Judges Allowing unelected judges to determine policy.  4.5% 
Religion Tying justifications to religious rhetoric.  4.1% 
Children  
Children will/will not be harmed by having 
parents of the same sex.  3.6% 
Nature 
The naturalness of male and female couples 
based on biology.  2.0% 
Economy 
Costs of including same-sex couples to receive 
the benefits of marriage.  1.0% 
 
 Most of these frames addressed two facets of morality. The first captured the immorality 
of homosexual behavior by framing the LGBT community as deviant, evil, and extreme. 
Bob Barr, the Republican representative from Georgia who introduced the legislation in 
the House asked in his testimony, “What more does it take America…. to see that this is 
an issue being shouted at us by extremists intent – bent – on forcing a tortured view of 
morality on the rest of the country?” (Lochhead,1996b). Others spoke of “decrying 
homosexual lifestyles” comparing same-sex marriage to polygamy and incest  
(Lochhead, 1996b; Smith, 1996; H.R. 3396, 1996).  The second facet spoke to the 
perceived moral consequences that would arise from legally recognizing same-sex 
66 
marriage. Several sources argue that marriage would be besieged, derogated or demeaned 
by the inclusion of same-sex marriages (H.R. 3396, 1996; Feder, 1996; Aquino, 1996). 
 Many of these morality frames are intimately tied to two other prominent themes: 
tradition and family. Many of the morality frames encompass these other frames by 
addressing the erosion of values associated with traditional heterosexual marriage and the 
family unit. Tradition, family, and morality are intimately connected in this analysis as 
tradition and family are considered institutions that foster and promote morality. The 
tradition frame is the second most common frame that specifically captures the historical 
context of marriage as a traditional heterosexual institution. This frame discusses the 
potential radical redefinition of marriage or revolutionizing aspect of including same-sex 
marriage in the “traditional structure of marriage” (H.R. 3396, 1996). 
 One of the other common frames, the family frame, is very similar to the other 
two, as the family frame also focuses on the erosion or derogation of the institution. To a 
lesser extent, the religion frame is also intimately tied to concepts of morality. Many of 
these frames conceptualize the issue of same-sex marriage as “an attack on a God given 
principle” and a practice that would “offend the religious and moral sensibilities of 
millions of Americans” (Yang, 1996; Lowy, 1996).  Twenty-seven of the frames used 
draw on these religious references that are tied closely to morality and values articulated 
in the Bible. Overall, three frames: morality, family, and tradition are predominantly used 
by the opposition coalition to define the problem of same-sex marriage.  
 Proponent coalition frames.  
 On the other hand, one of the most common frames used by the proponent 
coalition is the discrimination/intolerance frame (see Table 5.3).  
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Table 5.3 Proponent Coalition Frames  
Frames Description of Frames 
Percentage of Total 
Frames  
Election  Wedge issue, election year politicking 9.5% 
Intolerance 
Intolerance of others. Discrimination against a 
group.  7.7% 
Right 
Marriage is a fundamental/civil/equal rights 
issue.  6.0% 
Love 
Recognize relationships that are based on 
love.  5.3% 
Equality 
Same-sex couples should be on the same 
footing as heterosexual couples. Equality of 
the law.  2.9% 
Freedom 
Freedom to choose who to marry/Freedom to 
marry.  2.7% 
Justice 
Only fair or right to include same-sex couples 
in the institution of marriage.  1.0% 
Diversity Diversity strengthens society.  0.9% 
 
This frame highlights discrimination and intolerance inherent in the Defense of Marriage 
Act and the conceptualization of same-sex marriage as a problem more generally. 
Elizabeth Birch, head of the Human Rights Campaign, captures this sentiment when she 
argues that discrimination against gays and lesbians is discrimination against sons, 
daughters, brothers, and sisters (Overall, 1996).  The most common frame used by 
proponent groups is the election frame. This frame does not define the issue of same-sex 
marriage but tries to redirect the debate to define the problem of same-sex marriage by 
demonstrating the strategic introduction of this issue during an election year. This frame 
was consistently used throughout the proponent coalitions arguments for same-sex 
marriage. Because 1996 was a presidential election year, many politicians, LGBT 
organizations, and editorials point out the strategic placement of same-sex marriage onto 
the national agenda in an election year. Same–sex marriage is depicted as a “wedge 
issue” to use the LGBT community as a scapegoat, divide Americans, and split 
moderates from the Democratic Party (H.R. 3396, 1996; Lochhead, 1996b; Rich, 1996).   
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 Most of the other frames utilized by the proponent coalition are infrequently used 
and rarely utilized by the opposition coalition. The third most frequently used pro same-
sex marriage frame, the rights frame, constitutes only 6% of the frames used. This is a 
departure from previous literature tracing same-sex marriage frames which find the rights 
frame is the primary frame utilized by pro-same-sex marriage groups (Hull, 2001; Fisher, 
2009). This may mean that the proponent coalition tried to subsume and refute the 
opposition’s frames instead of constructing their own frames. This may also mean that 
these frames were unsuccessful at creating issue salience and mobilizing allies and were 
abandoned by proponent groups. The frames used by the proponents are also relatively 
reactive. The dominant frames, or the most frequent frames, used by proponents – the 
discrimination/intolerance frame and the election frame – both do not define same-sex 
marriage but instead are refutations to the arguments made by those in the opponent 
coalition. Neither positively highlights the issue of same-sex marriage but instead 
attempts to depict the opponent coalition as manipulative and divisive. 
 Analysis.  
 Overall, the conceptualization and framing of same-sex marriage found in this 
study does not by itself answer the question of whether or not the litigation in Hawaii 
prompted congressional action that resulted in the Defense of Marriage Act but does 
reveal some patterns that may be relevant when the political forces and participants are 
analyzed. The minimal use of frames that specifically address the Hawaii litigation 
signifies that these frames were not the primary way to define the problem of same-sex 
marriage. The opposition chose not to frame same-sex marriage by the litigation in 
Hawaii but rather the consequences of those events to the moral, traditional, and familial 
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structures of society. These frames are more deep seeded issues with same-sex marriage 
itself, rather than contextual and time specific frames about the possibility of same-sex 
marriage in the 1990’s. These frames may have been used to develop issue salience 
among a sympathetic public that was able to relate to the religious and traditional rhetoric 
used to define the problem of same-sex marriage.   
 In addition, the problem of same-sex marriage is conceptualized and framed 
primarily by the opponent coalition that defines the problem in terms of threats to 
tradition, family, and morality. These three frames represent almost 40% of the frames 
referenced, while the other 14 frames represent only 60%. This dominance in the 
contestation of frames signifies how the opposition coalition was able to dominate the 
discussion about same-sex marriage, which is reflected in the introduction and passage of 
DOMA.  The types of frames utilized by the proponent coalition also signify the 
opposition coalition’s dominance in the discussion of same-sex marriage, as the 
proponent’s frames are largely reactive responses to the opposition’s frames.   
 Regardless of the frames used, same-sex marriage was defined and framed at the 
national level in response to the litigation that took place in Hawaii. The existence of 
frames that define the problem in relation to Hawaii’s litigation acknowledges the fact 
that the litigation is integral to this response from the opposition. The absence of these 
frames does not dismiss the fact that the litigation in Hawaii is still central to the 
emergence of the issue of same-sex marriage onto the formal agenda of Congress.  The 
dominant frames used, particularly the morality, tradition, and family frames were all 
used to frame the issue of same-sex marriage in order to attract attention to the issue of 
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same-sex marriage, as these frames touch on deep seeded values about American society 
that would resonate with the public.   
 Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44; 1993) and the looming decision in 
Baehr v. Miike (1996 WL 694235, Hawai'i Cir.Ct.) that was likely to legalize same-sex 
marriage gave the opponents of same-sex marriage the opportunity to transform same-sex 
marriage into an important and imminent national problem that would disturb the moral, 
traditional, and familial sentiments of American culture. The litigation in Hawaii was 
both a focusing event and a symbol of the impending reality of same-sex marriage. The 
Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44; 1993) 
caught the attention of those opposed to same-sex marriage as it was the first legal 
decision that applied strict scrutiny in a discrimination case against gays and lesbians, 
making same-sex marriage all but legal in Hawaii. The upcoming trial represented the 
approaching legalization of same-sex marriage in the first U.S. state. Opponents could 
use Baehr v. Miike (1996 WL 694235, Hawai'i Cir.Ct.) as a symbol of the necessity for a 
federal policy to address the legal complications that would arise at both the state and 
federal level with this new union between couples of the same sex. If the litigation in 
Hawaii did not exist, it is unlikely that this mobilization against same-sex marriage and 
its place on Congress’s agenda would not have happened at this particular time.  
 Understanding how the problem is conceptualized, framed, and captured the 
attention of government officials can only partially explain how the events in Hawaii lead 
to congressional action that results in the Defense of Marriage Act. The political stream 
must also be assessed to understand how participants and political forces influence the 
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agenda setting process and propel the events in Hawaii to the formal congressional 
agenda. 
To what extent is each force in the politics stream responsible for DOMA’s agenda 
status? 
 Kingdon’s political stream, operating largely independently of the problem 
stream, is made up of electoral, partisan, and public opinion forces that influence the 
policy making process (Kingdon, 2003). These forces exist independently of the policy 
process but have the ability to affect the development of the agenda and subsequent 
policy. The following will examine the influence of public opinion, partisanship, and 
electoral forces on the movement of the same-sex marriage issue from Hawaii to 
Congress. 
 Public opinion.  
 Few public opinion polls before 1996 document the public sentiment on the topic 
of same-sex marriage. 1996 is the first year that the public’s opinion on same-sex 
marriage is captured in multiple opinion polls (see Table 5.4). This is evidence of same-
sex marriage’s arrival onto the systemic agenda, as opinion polls signify the salience of 
an issue within the public that allows political elites to gauge the public’s opinion. 
Questions about whether same-sex marriage should or should not be recognized legally 
from Gallup, the Pew Research Center, and Newsweek in 1996 all show responses that 
heavily oppose the recognition of same-sex marriage. All of the polls have over 50% of 
the sample rejecting the legality of same-sex marriage, and two of the three polls are well 
over 60%, signifying the public’s disagreement with legalizing same-sex marriages. Later 
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in this chapter, I will examine how public opinion interacts with the other forces, which 
will help clarify the degree to which public opinion is a significant factor in this study. 
Table 5.4 Public Opinion Polls  
Gallup Poll*: Do you think marriages between homosexuals should or should not be 
recognized by the law as valid, with the same rights as traditional marriages?   
       
Date Should Be Valid (%)  Should Not Be (%)  No Opinion (%) N 
3/15-3/17/96 27 68 5 1,008 
  
Pew Research Center*: Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose, or strongly oppose 
allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally?  
  
Date Favor (%) Oppose (%)  Don't Know (%)  N 
5/31-6/9/96 27 65 8 1,975 
          
Newsweek*: Do you think there should be or should not be… legally sanctioned gay 
marriages?   
  
Date Should (%)  Should Not (%)  Don't Know (%)  N 
5/22-5/23/96 33 58 9 779 
* Polling Data is taken from Brewer and Wilcox’s article “Trends: Same-Sex Marriage and Civil Unions” 
which cites the polling data from the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut, The Polling Report, 
and the websites of the poll sponsors (Brewer & Wilcox, 2005, 606). 
 
 Partisanship.  
 
 Prior to Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44; 1993), several courts had 
previously been forced to wrestle with the issue of same-sex marriage. It was not the first 
time that couples had pursued litigation in response to the denial of their marriage 
certificates, and it was not the first time that the courts had ruled on the issue. While none 
of the previous rulings had been in favor of same-sex couples, Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 
530; 852 P.2d 44; 1993) was also not a clear victory for the proponents of same-sex 
marriage. While it was monumental in the sense that strict scrutiny was applied to a case 
involving discrimination of gays and lesbians, it was by no means a legal victory when 
the Hawaii Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case to trial. The case was also 
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remanded in May of 1993 and did not go to trial until September of 1996, five months 
after the introduction of the Defense of Marriage Act in the House. This begs the question 
of how the Hawaii litigation prompted Congress to take up the issue of same-sex 
marriage in the summer of 1996.   
 In 1996, Congress had a Republican majority that had come to power for the first 
time in 40 years in the 1994 congressional elections. The 1994 election marked a 
substantial Republican victory that turned over 54 seats in the House and 8 seats in the 
Senate to the Republican Party (Office of the Clerk; Senate Historical Office). The 
election was a symbol of a Republican revolution that would lead to a more conservative 
agenda and drastic changes in policy, especially in light of the fact that the success of the 
Republican Party was partially attributed to the large evangelical Christian turnout in the 
1994 election (Campbell & Davidson, 2000; Wald, 2000). This was a significant level of 
turnover resulting from the 1994 election which brought with it new agenda items, 
including the Defense of Marriage Act. While representatives are not divided along 
partisan lines when it comes to LGBT issues, the fact that many Republicans are social 
conservatives makes it more likely that a bill against gays and lesbians would be passed 
in a Republican dominated legislature.
5
 In 1996, when the Defense of Marriage Act was 
introduced, Republicans made up 54% of the House and 53% of the Senate.
6
  
 While a Republican majority might have been necessary for DOMA’s 
introduction, it is not necessarily sufficient to explain same-sex marriage’s arrival on the 
                                               
5
 Ideology rather than party identity tends to be a more reliable indicator when predicting a representative’s 
vote on an issue that concerns morality politics. While party is not synonymous with ideology, it can be 
considered a proxy for ideology. 
6
 These numbers represent the partisan distributions when Congress voted on the Defense of Marriage Act. 
These numbers were cited due to changes in distribution after the 1994 election. All of the changes to the 
distribution were made prior to 1996, except for Congressman Bill Emerson (R) who passed away on June 
22, 1996. 
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congressional agenda. The politics of 1996 were also marked by divided government. 
President Clinton, an advocate of LGBT rights in his 1992 campaign and originally a 
champion for the removal of the military ban for gays and lesbians, would seem an 
unlikely candidate to vote in favor of DOMA, which is arguably a discriminatory piece of 
legislation against the LGBT community.  
 Electoral forces.  
 While the public’s strong opposition to same-sex marriage and the partisan 
distribution of Congress resulting from the turnover in 1994 laid the seeds allowing for 
same-sex marriage to reach the formal agenda, electoral forces also are responsible for 
propelling same-sex marriage to the federal level. The politics of a presidential election 
year are what separate this year from other years surrounding the decade long litigation in 
Hawaii. President Clinton was up for reelection and the new Republican coalition in 
government sought to oust the president for a Republican counterpart in the White House. 
The newspapers and documents in Congress point to the salience of election year politics 
throughout the discussions of the federal Defense of Marriage Act demonstrating the 
pivotal role that the election played in the nationalization of same-sex marriage. The 
following will highlight the plethora of evidence that demonstrates the critical role 
electoral forces play in same-sex marriage’s formal agenda status.  
  In 119 newspaper articles and two congressional documents, election year 
references are cited 65 different times, demonstrating the prevalence of election year 
politics in discussions about the Defense of Marriage Act. Because almost half of the 
sources contain references to the election’s effect on the issue, we can say that there does 
exist a relationship between the Defense of Marriage Act and the election year. The 
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proponents of same-sex marriage, including several congressional representatives refute 
the arguments of those that supported the bill by claiming that DOMA was “a desperate 
attempt to find an issue,” a  “wedge in the political tool box,” and an “election year ploy” 
(H.R. 3396, 1996; Goodman, 1996; Lochhead, 1996a).  Many in the proponent coalition 
accused the drafters and supporters of the bill of using gay Americans as “political fodder 
in an election year,” and engaging in a form of  “election year gay bashing” (Rich, 1996; 
Hennessy, 1996). Others termed the bill “The Defense of Incumbents Act” or “The Dole 
Campaign Rehabilitation Act of 1996” (Lanpher, 1996; H.R. 3396, 1996). On the other 
hand, the opponents of same-sex marriage do not reference the election throughout the 
documents and newspaper articles unless to refute the proponent’s of same-sex marriage 
references to it.  Opponents dismiss the timing of the Defense of Marriage Act as an 
electoral strategy and instead suggest that the timing of the bill coincides with the 
imminent decision in Baehr v. Miike (1996 WL 694235, Hawai'i Cir.Ct.), highlighting the 
importance of the Hawaii litigation to the emergence of same-sex marriage onto the 
congressional agenda.  
 Evidence from the cosponsors and roll call votes is also informative to understand 
the importance of electoral forces. The table below shows cosponsors and roll call votes 
for DOMA organized by party and chamber. There were 117 cosponsors for the House 
version of the bill and 24 sponsors for the Senate version of the bill.  To create a 
comparison, on average House bills have 22.2 cosponsors while the Senate bills on 
average have 7.2 cosponsors (Wilson & Young, 1997). Both the House and Senate were 
able to garner almost 25% of each chamber’s membership to cosponsor, showing a strong 
level of support for the bill. 
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Table 5.5  
Partisan Distributions in Congress     
  Republican Democrat  Independent  
Partisan Make Up of House* 235 198 1 
Partisan Make Up of Senate*  53 47   
Cosponsors in House 105 12   
Cosponsors in Senate 24 0   
Votes For DOMA in House 224 118   
Votes Against DOMA in House  1 65 1 
Votes for DOMA in Senate 53 31   
Votes Against DOMA in Senate 0 14   
Abstain or Not Present in 
either chamber of Congress  9 16   
  
 Almost 90% of the cosponsors in the House are Republican and all of the 
cosponsors in the Senate are Republican demonstrating strong Republican support for the 
legislation. Scholars argue that cosponsorship is a signal sent to constituents, interest 
groups, and donors to demonstrate support for their causes. It is also a cue to chamber 
leaders, who have immense power over the agenda setting process in Congress, to put 
legislation on the calendar that can politically benefit the majority party (Koger, 2003). 
The high level of Republican cosponsors may have been a signal to the judiciary 
committee and majority party leaders of the support for this bill to move through 
Congress. While the House and Senate could have passed DOMA without the help of 
Democrats, DOMA represents a bipartisan piece of legislation. Both chambers passed the 
bills by a supermajority of 78% and 84% (Office of the Clerk; United States Senate 
Archives).  
 The lack of Democratic cosponsors but the large level of Democratic support in 
passage is another confirmation that electoral forces are responsible for the 
nationalization of same-sex marriage. Voting against DOMA would have been 
detrimental to Democrats given the high levels of public opposition to same-sex 
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marriage. Many members’ constituencies would have a majority opposed to same-sex 
marriage, making it politically unadvisable to vote against DOMA, even if a member’s 
political beliefs would have led him to vote against it. Once the issue was introduced in 
Congress, it was politically important to end up on the right side of the issue, regardless 
of personal stance (Kingdon, 1989; Haider-Markel, 2001). The same holds true for 
President Clinton, who had to walk a fine line between his allies in the LGBT community 
and the larger public sentiment that opposed same-sex marriages. 
 The influence of electoral forces is also evident in the 1996 Democratic and 
Republican Party platforms. The Democratic Party platform makes no references to 
same-sex marriage or the Defense of Marriage Act. The only mention of the LGBT 
community is referenced in the discussion about fighting discrimination and protecting 
civil rights where the Democratic Party claims to continue to fight its ongoing battle to 
end discrimination based on sexual orientation. The rhetoric of the platform also 
distances itself from the rhetoric that defines the problem of same-sex marriage, focusing 
on ideas such as community, opportunity, and responsibility (Democratic Party Platform, 
1996). The Republican Party platform on the other hand is littered with rhetoric similar to 
that used in the discussion of same-sex marriage and DOMA. The Republican Platform 
often references morality, values, and the importance of the institution of family. It also 
makes two references to the Defense of Marriage Act both in support of its passage. They 
also explicitly reference the LGBT community as the Republican Party “rejects the 
distortion of anti-discrimination statutes to cover sexual preference” (Republican Party 
Platform, 1996). The platforms demonstrate the use of DOMA and same-sex marriage as 
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issues of Republican strength, which are used to help garner votes for the 1996 
presidential election.  
 The significant influence that electoral forces have on elevation of same sex 
marriage to the formal agenda runs contrary to Kingdon’s assessment of electoral 
participants and forces. His study finds that the electoral forces only indirectly affect the 
agenda due to the fact that elections bring about a turnover of government officials who 
may bring with them new priorities for the agenda (Kingdon, 2003, 62). While the 
turnover in personnel is significant from the 1994 elections, the 1996 electoral forces that 
play on the movement of same-sex marriage to the formal agenda are substantial. The 
evidence above substantiates the point that the election was key to the introduction of the 
issue of same-sex marriage in 1996 and arguably may not have taken place in the same 
dramatic fashion had this not been a presidential election year.  
Who is responsible for putting same-sex marriage on the congressional agenda? 
 While the forces in the politics and problem streams are important to 
understanding the agenda setting process, it is crucial to examine the actors responsible 
for problem definition, issue salience, and issue introduction. The following will assess 
the relevant actors and their influence on same-sex marriage’s place on the formal agenda 
in light of the previous analysis of problem definition and influential political forces.   
 Congressional representatives.  
 Congress’s influential role in this study cannot be underscored. Kingdon finds in 
his study that members of Congress are one of the two most influential actors in the 
agenda setting process and this study follows in line with that finding (Kingdon, 2003, 
34). It is the support of members of Congress who have the legal authority to create, 
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sponsor, and pass the legislation that made same-sex marriage a formal agenda item. 
Congressional representatives, particularly Representative Bob Barr (R: GA) and Senator 
Don Nickles (R: OK), are responsible for the introduction of the Defense of Marriage 
Act, which is a major contributing factor to the nationalization of same-sex marriage. 
 The popularity of the bill and the salience of the debate about same-sex marriage 
with regards to the Defense of Marriage Act in Congress are two of the indicators that 
point to the congressional membership’s complicity in nationalizing the same-sex 
marriage debate. The high level of cosponsors shown in Table 5.3 and the high support 
for the bill’s passage at 78% in the House and 84% in the Senate are evidence of this. 
This data shows that the majority of Congress was supportive of the bill, alluding to 
acceptance or approval of same-sex marriage’s place on the formal agenda. Five hearings 
were held on H.R. 3396: The Defense of Marriage Act in the House and two were held in 
the Senate between its introduction on May 7, 1996 and its passage on September 21, 
1996 showing a moderate level of debate over the issue. While this is not definitive, 
when coupled with the quick introduction and passage of DOMA, it is apparent that 
members of Congress supported the bill and its implications for nationalizing the issue of 
same-sex marriage. While the members of Congress are undoubtedly a major player in 
this study, it is important to remember that these actors are not free wheeling agents but 
are constrained by other actors and political forces. The partisan distributions in 
Congress, electoral forces, public opinion and interest groups in this study do put 
significant pressure on members of Congress, making it necessary to assess these other 
relevant factors.  
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 The president.  
 In the same way, the President is considerably constrained, as he is largely 
influenced by the partisan and electoral forces surrounding same-sex marriage’s 
movement to the formal agenda. While Kingdon finds that the president is often the most 
influential agenda setter, this study is an example of the President’s inability to control or 
shape the agenda (Kingdon, 2003, 23). During this period of divided government in 
which Republicans controlled both chambers of Congress, leaders in the legislature were 
able to forge ahead with their own agenda without consulting the President. The President 
had few allies with substantial power within Congress to try to influence the trajectory of 
the agenda and instead had to largely respond to the decisions of Republican 
representatives. These partisan forces made it difficult for the President to wield any 
power over the make up of the formal agenda.  
 The second is that despite the president’s substantial amount of resources to try to 
influence the trajectory of the legislation, the election year forces constrained his ability 
to respond. President Clinton’s approval ratings between May and September range from 
53% to 60%, showing a fair amount of support for the President during the debate over 
the Defense of Marriage Act in Congress (Gallup, 1996). This level of support ought to 
have been somewhat of an advantage for Clinton but same-sex marriage’s controversial 
nature made it difficult for President Clinton to choose a position. A week after the 
Defense of Marriage was introduced in the House, President Clinton’s White House 
spokesman said that Clinton would most likely sign the bill as it was “’consistent with his 
personally stated view that he opposes same-sex marriage’” but clarified “that the bill 
was ‘designed to provoke hostility towards gays and lesbians’ and is being used by 
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Republicans as a ‘wedge issue’ to ‘divide Americans’” (Lochhead & Tuller, 1996). Prior 
to signing the bill on September 20, 1996 President Clinton was clear that the bill was 
meant to “confirm the right of each state to determine its own public policy with respect 
to same gender marriage” but that it was not meant to condone any discrimination based 
on sexual orientation (Strobel, 1996). President Clinton also signed the bill on September 
21, 1996 just after midnight to minimize the press and commotion over his signature, 
illustrating his attempt to discretely pass the bill into law without further alienating his 
LGBT allies (Kurtz, 1996).  
  Ultimately the president would take a backseat role on the issue of same sex 
marriage. Clinton’s statements and reservations about the bill show how the introduction 
of the bill in the heat of an election year constrained his ability to combat or redirect the 
issue. The president had to walk a fine line on the issue so as to not alienate large 
constituencies before the election. Unable to control the agenda, his only politically 
viable option was to sign the bill to dilute the Republican’s attempt to garner substantial 
votes from moderates over the issue of same-sex marriage.  
 The states. 
 Another actor that must be assessed is the states and their effect on the 
congressional agenda. Prior to the 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court ruling in Baehr v. Lewin 
(74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44; 1993), only three states, Wyoming, New Hampshire, and 
Maryland had statutory language prohibiting the recognition of out of state same-sex 
marriages, also known as a mini DOMA (Barclay, 2010; National Conference of State 
Legislatures, 2011). Before the year 1996, only one state, Utah, had successfully passed a 
mini DOMA (Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, 2011). By the end of 1996, 
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state legislatures had introduced a plethora of mini DOMAs, 15 of which passed that 
same year. The table below shows all of the states that introduced mini DOMAs in the 
year 1996.   
Table 5.6 State Defense of Marriage Acts (1996) 
State Bill Number  
Date of Introduction 
into One House of 
State Legislature  Date of Passage 
Alaska HB 308; SB 30  3/14/96 5/7/96 
Alabama  HB 1942; SB 396  Introduced before 4/16 No Passage 
Arizona SB 1038  ?? 5/5/96 
California AB 1982: AB 3227  9/15/95 No Passage 
Colorado HB 1291 1/31/96 No Passage 
Delaware HB 503  4/4/96 6/21/96 
Florida HB 2369 3/6/1996; 12/30/96 No Passage 
Georgia HB 1580 2/14/96 4/2/96 
Idaho HB 658  1/12/96 3/18/96 
Illinois SB 1773 2/9/96 5/24/96 
Kansas SB 515 ?? 4/10/96 
Kentucky HB 500   Introduced before 4/16 No Passage 
Maryland HB 1268 2/15/96 No Passage 
Michigan HB 5662; SB 937 3/7/96 6/26/96 
Mississippi HB 1210; SB 2863  Failed by 4/16 No Passage 
Missouri  HSSB 786 5/17/96 7/3/96 
Nebraska LB 1260 ?? No Passage 
New Jersey AB 2193; SB 1376 ?? No Passage 
New Mexico SJR 10  1/31/96 No Passage 
New York AB 9861; 7345 ?? No Passage 
North Carolina HB 1302  5/23/96 6/20/96 
Oklahoma  SB 73  4/1/96 4/29/96 
Pennsylvania SB 434; HB 2604 5/7/96 10/16/96 
South Carolina R388; H4502 1/25/96 5/20/96 
South Dakota* HB 1143  ??  2/21/96 
Tennesse  SB 2306; HB 2907 1/17/96 5/22/96 
Washington HB 2262 1/8/96 No Passage 
West Virginia HB 4730  Failed by 4/16  No Passage 
Wisconsin AB 1042 3/18/96 No Passage 
* The data for this table was collected from a variety of sources including Lambda Legal, newspaper 
articles found on Lexis Nexis, and State Legislature Archive Websites. All “??” represent dates that could 
not be found.  
* South Dakota’s statute is somewhat different from other mini DOMAs in that it solely states, “Be it 
enacted by the legislature of the State of South Dakota: Any marriage between persons of the same gender 
is null and void from the beginning” (S. D. House Bill 1184).  
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 If the states were concerned with the events in Hawaii and the possible legal 
repercussions that might ensue from the Full Faith and Credit Clause, one would expect 
to see many states introduce legislation after the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision in 
1993. It would also be logical to predict that states might emulate the federal government 
by introducing legislation similar to the federal DOMA shortly after the introduction or 
passage of DOMA in Congress. Instead, many of the states introduce their mini DOMAs 
in the early months of 1996. Most states introduced legislation prior to the introduction of 
the federal Defense of Marriage Act demonstrating how states were actually the first to 
develop the policy ideas of DOMA. The introduction of the issue in the state legislatures 
in 1996 may also point to the salience of electoral forces that made the strategic 
introduction of the issue in an election year beneficial to those that opposed same-sex 
marriage.   
 While the proliferation of state Defense of Marriage Acts in 1996 contributed to 
the nationalization of the same-sex marriage debate, it is difficult to pinpoint if the states 
influence the movement of same-sex marriage to the congressional agenda. The sponsors 
of the Senate and House Defense of Marriage Acts, Senator Don Nickles (R:OK) and 
Congressman Bob Barr (R:GA), both had mini DOMAs introduced in their states earlier 
that year which may have influenced their choice to sponsor the bills in Congress. The 
proliferation of mini DOMAs in the states in early 1996 would have created substantial 
issue salience over same-sex marriage,which had not previously existed. Congress may 
have been more aware of the issue’s salience in state governments, which possibly 
prompted them to take action.  
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 Organized interests.  
 Interest group coalitions in Kingdon’s study are found to be one of the prominent, 
influential actors on agenda setting. My research also finds that interest groups are 
influential in shaping the agenda. It is important to first note the existence of interest 
group participation in the process and then assess the relative influence that the proponent 
coalition and the opponent coalition have on the formal agenda of Congress with regards 
to same-sex marriage.  
 The evidence is clear that interest groups participated in the process of putting 
same-sex marriage on the formal agenda. Interest groups were clearly involved in the 
litigation in Hawaii as The Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund joined the 
plaintiffs as co-counsel prior to the trial in 1996, and both proponent interest groups and 
opponent interest groups submitted amicus briefs to the Hawaii Supreme and Circuit 
Court.
7
 Some of these proponent and opponent groups testified in Congress during the 
hearing before the House Subcommittee of the Constitution, including Elizabeth Birch, 
the executive director of the Human Rights Campaign (pro same-sex marriage), Nancy 
McDonald, the Vice President of Parents Families and Friends of Lesbians and Gays (pro 
same-sex marriage) or submitted statements, such as the National Gay and Lesbian Task 
Force (pro same-sex marriage), and Jay Sekulow of the American Center for Law and 
Justice (anti same-sex marriage). Reverend Lou Sheldon of the Traditional Values 
Coalition was even present and involved in the drafting of the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act (anti same-sex marriage).  
                                               
7
 The following are some of the organizations that submitted amicus curiae during the Hawaii litigation on 
same-sex marriage: American Civil Liberties Union of Hawaii Foundation, Coral Ridge Ministries Media, 
Inc., Lambda Legal; Concerned Women for America, American Family Association Law Center, Specialty 
Research Associates, Alaskans Opposed to Pro-homosexual Policies, Christian Family Network, 
Traditional Values Coalition, Free Congress Research & Education Foundation and Coalitions for America.  
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 Media coverage is an indicator that points to the salience of interest groups, as 
these groups are mentioned 98 times in 119 news articles, as quoted sources or mentioned 
for their involvement in the events surrounding the federal DOMA. This itself shows the 
prevalence of interest groups in the process of agenda setting. Table 5.5 lists the groups 
mentioned and the frequency with which they are mentioned.  
Table 5.7 
Interest Group Frequency  
Proponents Opponents 
American Civil Liberties Union (4) American Center for Law and Justice (1)  
Gay and Lesbians for Individual Liberty (1) American Family Association (2) 
Hawaii Equal Rights Marriage Project (2)  Christian Civic League (1) 
Human Rights Campaign (33) Christian Coalition (6) 
Lambda Legal (10) Concerned Women of America (2) 
Lobby for Freedom and Equality (1) Family Research Council (10)  
National Center for Lesbian Rights (1)  Focus on the Family (3) 
National Education Association (1)  The Report (2)  
National Freedom to Marry Coalition (1) Traditional Value's Coalition (6)  
National Gay and Lesbian Task force (5)  U.S. Catholic Conference (1)  
People for the American Way (2)    
Religious Center for Reform (1)   
The Republican Log Cabin Club (1)    
Universal Fellowship of Metro Churches (1)   
 
In total, 98 interest groups are mentioned in the newspapers with 34 attributed to 
opponent interest groups while 64 are attributed to proponent interest groups. Proponent 
interest groups represent almost double the number of opponent interest groups in the 
media. This does not indicate influence however as proponent interest groups were 
relatively ineffective at blocking same-sex marriage from the formal agenda of Congress 
or defeating the bill once it was introduced. The salience of opponent coalitions frames 
discussed in the section addressing the problem stream and framing is further evidence of 
the fact that proponent interest groups were unable to mobilize effectively. The frames 
that define the issue in terms of tradition, morality, and family eclipse the other 
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arguments, showing the dominance of the opposition’s definitions of same-sex marriage. 
While the prevalence of interest groups in the newspapers and an examination of the 
frames do give some indication of interest group influence, a more in-depth look reveals 
the coordinated efforts, particularly of the Christian Right’s mobilized constituency to 
define same-sex marriage as a problem that necessitated government action. Opposition 
groups were instrumental in creating issue salience about same-sex marriage that led to 
Congress’s decision to address the issue of same-sex marriage.  
 Conservative religious groups prolifically organized to “defend” the institution of 
marriage in the 1990s (D’Emilio, 2000). These groups, in response to the litigation in 
Hawaii organized a national campaign to make same-sex marriage a salient political issue 
to preempt the likely legalization of same-sex marriage in Hawaii. The implications of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution made it important to federalize 
the issue of same-sex marriage to protect other states from being forced to recognize 
same-sex marriages performed in other states. In January of 1996, several conservative 
religious groups met in a Memphis Church to organize a coordinated plan to propel the 
issue of same sex marriage onto the formal agendas of the state and federal governments 
(Johnson, 1996; Walker, 1996). On February 10, 1996, several groups, including the 
American Family Association, the Eagle Forum, the Christian Coalition, the Traditional 
Values Coalition, The Report, and The Concerned Women of America sponsored a 
campaign rally to promote the newly founded coalition, The National Campaign to 
Protect Marriage (CSPAN, 1996). This rally was attended by many Republican 
presidential nominees and was designed to expand the conflict surrounding same-sex 
marriage and coordinate efforts to push for same-sex marriage bans throughout the states. 
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In many ways this campaign is a tangible representation of the larger Christian Right 
social movement that developed in the late 1970s to defend traditional moral values 
(Green, 2000). This social movement, along with several key political allies, was able to 
coordinate on a large scale a substantial backlash to the litigation that took place in 
Hawaii.  
 Haider-Markel’s study of policy diffusion of same-sex marriage examines the 
influence of conservative religious groups at the state level and finds that all of the states 
that introduced legislation banning same-sex marriage had conservative groups lobbying 
for the bill, 25 states had these groups help draft the bill, and 39 states had established 
connections between the sponsor of the bill and a conservative religious group (Haider-
Markel, 2001).
8
 This entrenched involvement at the state level may be a possible 
indicator of the involvement of these conservative groups at the national level. Some 
scholars argue that the states were a more favorable battleground for those opposed to 
same-sex marriages and that the diffusion of policy from one state to another was a 
coordinated effort by opposition interest groups to increase the salience of the issue of 
same-sex marriage and geographically expand the arena of conflict with the ultimate goal 
of putting it on the national agenda (Johnson, 1996; Haider-Markel, 2000, 2001; 
Blomquist, 2007). The introductions of state Defense of Marriage Acts in 1996 were a 
coordinated effort for opposition interest groups to create issue salience that resulted in 
same-sex marriage’s place on the formal agendas of state legislatures. The geographical 
                                               
8
 Haider-Markel’s study measures the “links between the bill sponsor and religious group” as one of the 
following: “the bill sponsor held a press conference with a religious interest group, that a bill sponsor was a 
member or leader of a religious interest group, or that a bill sponsor made financial contributions to a 
religious group, such as the Traditional Values Coalition or the Christian Coalition” (Haider-Markel, 2001, 
22). 
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expansion of the issue of same-sex marriage in early 1996 could have been taken by 
Congress as a signal of the necessity to address the issue.  
 The media.  
 Kingdon’s analysis dismisses the importance of the media’s impact on the 
government’s agenda. Kingdon’s argument that the media is largely responding to 
government officials and the formal agenda is apparent in the case of same-sex marriage. 
Media coverage in U.S. newspapers on “same-sex marriage” and “gay marriage” in a 
search on Lexis Nexis only found 20 articles predating the introduction of DOMA to 
Congress, demonstrating that the media was not following the issue of same-sex marriage 
until same-sex marriage was introduced to the formal agenda. The document analysis 
also revealed that most of the articles reiterated the story of DOMA superficially and 
used quotes from congressional testimony or relevant interest groups to substantiate the 
points made about same-sex marriage. Even for a salient issue such as same-sex 
marriage, the media was not responsible for the issue’s agenda status. The media may 
have a had a more indirect influence on the public, as the media most likely informed the 
public of same-sex marriage’s place on the formal agenda, which could have in turn 
created greater issue salience. Establishing this connection empirically is difficult and 
beyond the scope of this research. The last part of this chapter will tie together the 
findings of this study to answer the overarching question.  
Does the litigation in Hawaii over same-sex marriage prompt congressional action 
that results in the Defense of Marriage Act? 
 This research sought to answer the question of whether or not the political and 
legal developments in Hawaii result in the introduction of the Defense of Marriage Act to 
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Congress. I expected to find evidence of how the legal developments in Hawaii spurred 
members of Congress to introduce the Defense of Marriage Act, symbolizing the 
nationalization of same-sex marriage that had previously been a state issue. Political 
elites, the media, and scholars claim that the litigation in Hawaii over same-sex marriage 
is responsible for the congressional action that resulted in the Defense of Marriage Act. 
The explicit references in the congressional documents to the litigation in Hawaii as a 
catalyst for the bill makes the connection between the two seem obvious and explicit. 
  The research in this study finds that the litigation in Hawaii is partially 
responsible for congressional action that results in the introduction of the federal Defense 
of Marriage Act. The decision by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 
530; 852 P.2d 44; 1993) to apply strict scrutiny to the sex discrimination inherent in 
Hawaii’s Revised Statues §572-1 which barred same-sex couples from obtaining 
marriage licenses in the state of Hawaii, made it likely that same-sex marriage would be 
legal for the first time in U.S history. This monumental decision acted as a focusing 
event, capturing the attention of those that opposed same-sex marriage. Faced with the 
likely legalization of same-sex marriage, the opponents took action to prevent the spread 
of same-sex marriage to other states. While the litigation in Hawaii was a catalyst that 
prompted congressional action that resulted in the Defense of Marriage Act’s 
introduction to Congress, the litigation in Hawaii is not solely responsible for DOMA. 
Kingdon argues that the agenda setting process is littered with multiple causalities that 
affect an issue’s movement to the formal agenda and this study finds that it is the 
interaction effects of multiple variables that result in same-sex marriage’s place on 
Congress’s formal agenda (Kingdon, 2003). Understanding how same-sex marriage 
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becomes a federal issue with the introduction of DOMA requires looking not only at the 
litigation in Hawaii and DOMA but at the various participants and forces that contribute 
to same-sex marriages place in federal politics.  
 The organized interests that opposed same-sex marriage were integral to the 
movement of the issue of same-sex marriage from the distant litigation in Hawaii to the 
agenda of Congress. Interest groups and key political elites who were opposed to the 
legalization of same-sex marriage strategically responded to the imminent threat of same-
sex marriage with the looming decision in Baehr v. Miike (1996 WL 694235, Hawai'i 
Cir.Ct.) by coordinating a campaign to push same-sex marriage onto the formal agenda of 
the federal and state legislatures. These interest groups and political elites purposefully 
introduced the issue of same-sex marriage to both the systemic and formal agenda by 
using a variety of tactics. Those that opposed same-sex marriage framed the problem of 
same-sex marriage as a morality, family, and tradition issue to develop issue salience 
among government officials and the public that were overwhelmingly opposed to the 
legalization of same-sex marriage. The litigation in Hawaii was used less frequently to 
frame the problem of same-sex marriage but was nonetheless used to stress the urgency 
of government action to prevent the spread of same-sex marriage to other states. The 
opposition groups also used the state legislatures as a tool to geographically expand the 
conflict of same-sex marriage to develop substantial issue salience among political elites 
and the public. These opposition groups also heavily lobbied the state and federal 
governments to further their aims of preventing the legalization and recognition of same-
sex marriage by the federal and state governments.   
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 Members of Congress are also important participants that had a hand in moving 
same-sex marriage to its place on the formal agenda. Although there may have been 
substantial pressure from the opposition coalition to take on the issue, the members of 
Congress ultimately decided to introduce, support, and pass the Defense of Marriage Act. 
The support for DOMA in Congress, evidenced by the high levels of sponsorship and 
votes for passage, demonstrate Congress’s willingness to legislate in an area normally 
reserved to the states and expand the scope of conflict about same-sex marriage from the 
state level to the national level.  Partisanship forces also play a part in the movement of 
the issue of same-sex marriage to Congress’s agenda, as the new Republican majority 
may have been key to introducing this new agenda item. Conservative religious groups, 
who were largely responsible for the mobilization against same-sex marriage and the 
lobbying activities associated with the Defense of Marriage Act, found sympathetic ears 
with a Republican majority and utilized this opportunity to introduce a bill that rejected 
the legalization of same-sex marriage at the federal level and gave states the ability to 
ignore the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution to disregard same-sex 
marriages performed in other states.  
 The electoral forces in this presidential election year are also an important factor 
that helped place same-sex marriage on Congress’s agenda. The prevalence of electoral 
frames in the documents demonstrates the salience of the election, which was embedded 
in discussions about same-sex marriage and the Defense of Marriage Act.  The electoral 
considerations in introducing the issue to formal legislative agendas is evidenced by the 
fact that in the first half of 1996 almost half of the states and Congress introduced 
legislation to prevent the recognition of out of state same-sex marriages. By introducing 
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the issue of same-sex marriage to legislatures in an election year, elected officials were 
further constrained by the public’s opinion as pleasing the public in an election year can 
be key to reelection in the fall. Election years are also characterized by additional media 
attention, creating more issue salience for same-sex marriage, a new and controversial 
political issue. Due to the high levels of public opposition to same-sex marriage and the 
higher levels of media coverage on the issue, more elected officials would vote in favor 
of the Defense of Marriage Act, even if it went against their preferences. President 
Clinton’s rhetoric demonstrates this dilemma that many elected officials were faced with 
when it came to the Defense of Marriage Act’s passage. Had electoral forces not been 
present, we may have seen a different outcome with regards to the issue of same-sex 
marriage and the Defense of Marriage Act.  
 Overall, it is the interaction of multiple factors that are responsible for the 
introduction of DOMA to Congress. The legal developments in Hawaii are responsible 
for same-sex marriage’s movement to Congress’s agenda because the litigation raised 
awareness about the issue and prompted those who opposed same-sex marriage to take 
action to preempt the decision in Baehr v. Miike (1996 WL 694235, Hawai'i Cir.Ct.) and 
prevent the spread of same-sex marriages to other states. The opponents of same-sex 
marriage took advantage of the partisan and electoral forces to introduce the issue of 
same-sex marriage in 1996 when it would foster the most issue salience and have the 
most likely chance of passage. Members of Congress, both constrained and emboldened 
by the electoral consequences associated with the issue of same-sex marriage, were 
responsible for introducing the issue of same-sex marriage to Congress with the Defense 
of Marriage Act, supporting same-sex marriage’s place on the formal agenda. The 
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combination of the litigation in Hawaii, the electoral and partisanship forces present in 
1996, the participation of members of Congress, and an organized conservative coalition 
are responsible for the emergence of same-sex marriage onto the formal agenda with the 

































 This study sought to answer the question: Did the litigation over same-sex 
marriage in Hawaii prompt congressional action that resulted in the Defense of Marriage 
Act? This study finds that the litigation in Hawaii acted as a catalyst that prompted the 
introduction of the federal Defense of Marriage Act to Congress. While the litigation in 
Hawaii was responsible for focusing attention on the issue of same-sex marriage, the 
decision in Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44; 1993) did not cause the 
introduction of DOMA to Congress. It was the convergence of multiple factors that 
resulted in same-sex marriage’s place on Congress’s agenda.  
 The opponents of same-sex marriage, composed of both political elites and 
interest groups, responded to the litigation in Hawaii by coordinating a national effort to 
foster issue salience and move the issue of same-sex marriage to the formal agendas of 
legislatures. Those that opposed same-sex marriage used the pending court case in Baehr 
v. Miike (1996 WL 694235, Hawai'i Cir.Ct.) to signify an immediate threat to the 
traditional institution of marriage, which had to be resolved with quick congressional 
intervention. These actors purposely introduced the issue to a Republican Congress in an 
election year to intensify issue salience and increase the chances that same-sex marriage 
would make it onto the formal agenda and lead to the passage of DOMA. Overall the 
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opposition coalition’s organization in response to the litigation in Hawaii, Congress’s 
willingness and desire to federalize the issue of same-sex marriage, and the salient 
electoral and partisan forces that surrounded the events in 1996 were responsible for 
bringing same-sex marriage to the national agenda.  
Limitations 
 While this study does highlight specific participants – the opposition coalition and 
members of Congress – and specific factors – the litigation in Hawaii, partisanship, and 
electoral forces -- that influence same-sex marriage’s place on the formal agenda, this 
study does not establish casual relationships. Studies of the policy process make it close 
to impossible to develop specific causalities due to the fact that so many factors can 
influence the process (Kingdon, 2003). This study instead tested a popularly held 
assumption that Baehr v. Lewin (74 Haw. 530; 852 P.2d 44; 1993) was responsible for 
same-sex marriage’s movement to Congress. This study’s finding that the litigation in 
Hawaii is integral to same-sex marriage’s placement on the formal agenda of Congress, 
also finds that several other factors played a part in this process. While this study cannot 
say with certainty which variables caused the introduction of the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act, the study tries to capture the more complicated process of agenda setting 
and delineate the variables that are responsible for the Defense of Marriage Act. 
  Other limitation of this study include restraints on time, access to data, and 
resources that made it difficult to operationalize some of the variables and find data to 
test the hypothesis. While I am confident that these variables’ indicators help us 
understand the influence of each variable, a more in-depth look at each variable may 
yield even more reliable results. The triangulation of the data with the use of interviews 
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with actors involved with the events in Hawaii and the Defense of Marriage Act may help 
us better answer the questions in this study. This study also has the possibility for slight 
inaccuracies in the data due to human error. This should not detract from the study 
though as this research was systematic, deliberate, and methodical.  
Implications and Future Research 
 
 The findings in this study have implications for both policy and theory. The 
common assumption that the litigation in Hawaii causes the nationalization of same-sex 
marriage with the introduction of the federal Defense of Marriage Act displaces the fact 
that other factors are important to understanding how issues end up on the congressional 
agenda. This study highlights the importance of electoral forces that are strategically used 
to introduce an issue to the formal agenda and pass policy. Kingdon’s study downplays 
the importance of electoral forces on the agenda setting process and this study questions 
that finding. The findings in this research indicate that it is important to understand how 
electoral implications can influence the introduction and passage of policy. This is 
especially important in light of the fact that the legislation examined in this study is 
considered by some to be an unconstitutional application of the law and an overstepping 
of congressional authority. Knowing how electoral forces shape the trajectory of the 
policy process can help us understand how new issues end up on the agenda, and can help 
inform strategies to block arguably discriminatory and hasty legislation that results from 
electoral constraints. 
 There are also theoretical implications that arise form this case. Kingdon’s 
framework was useful to organize the confusing and complicated agenda setting process 
examined in this paper but it is not necessarily useful for explaining which variables were 
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significant. Separating the politics and problem streams may be organizationally useful 
but it does not necessarily describe the process of agenda setting accurately here. The 
problem stream and politics stream are significantly blurred in this study as the 
construction of the problem and the political forces that influence this process often 
influence one another. This may be due to the fact that the issue of same-sex marriage is a 
morality issue that is relatively distinct from other types of policy. Morality issues are 
defined by “clashes of first principle” or arguments over fundamental values on 
“technically simple and salient public policy issues with high citizen participation” 
(Mooney, 1999, 676). Because morality politics are a different realm of policy, it may not 
be prudent to use theoretical frameworks that are based on distributive and redistributive 
policies. Morality policy has developed a loose theoretical framework that focuses on 
several key variables including partisanship, public opinion, and issue salience but this 
framework needs to be systematically tested to create a useful framework for 
understanding the agenda setting process of morality issues which often have profound 
implications for the rights and liberties of individuals (Glick & Hutchinson, 1999; 
Haider-Markel, 1999; Mooney, 1999). Future research should focus on developing a 
framework to help explain the policy process, particularly agenda setting in relation to 
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Morality:  Same-sex marriage is immoral.  
                  Bill reflects national social mores.  
                  The push for same-sex marriage encodes deviant behavior in legal form.  
                  Same-sex marriage is an attack on American values.  
                  Same-sex marriage demeans or assaults the institution of marriage.  
 
Tradition: Overturn years of tradition on the issue of marriage.  
                   Radical shift in the oldest institution of civilization.  
                   Same-sex couples want to change the definition of marriage.  
                   Attempt to defend marriage against a radical assault.  
 
State's    Application of Full Faith & Credit Clause forces states to recognize same-sex marriages. 
Rights:    States should have the right to decide on the question of same-sex marriage. 
               One state should not set the standards for all other states.  
 
Election: Introduce issue in the heat of a presidential campaign.   
                 Same-sex marriage was introduced to garner support for Republicans.  
                 Wedge issue. 
                 Campaign issue.  
                 Gay issue used as a political weapon.  
                 Desperate search for a political issue.  
 
Family:   Uphold family values. 
                Affirmation of the traditional nuclear family.  
                The legalization of same-sex marriage alters the basic unit of the family.   
               Blow to the American family.  
 
Intolerance: The bill is a form of gay-bashing or gay-baiting.  
                        Discrimination against the LGBT community is illegal and unconstitutional. 
                        Republicans are displaying bigotry against our most unpopular minority.  
                        Bill is a form of hate against a particular group.   
 
Rights:  Gay couples should be given the right that everyone else enjoys. 
               Grant equal rights to all of our citizens.  
             Homosexuality is the last unfinished chapter of civil rights history.  
               Equal rights.  
 
Love:     Same-sex couples have the same committed loving relationship as heterosexual couples.  
              Important lifetime commitment to one another.  
 
Judges:  Allowing unelected judges to make policy.  
                Judicial activism.  
                Liberal judges to legislate morality.  
                Supreme Court of Hawaii cannot decide these issues for everyone.  
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Religion:  It goes against the holy scriptures. 
                  Religious beliefs say that being gay is wrong.  
                  The institution of marriage between male and female is set forth in the Holy Bible.  
                  A God given principle is under attack.  
Children: A threat to the children’s wellbeing. 
                 Children should be raised in heterosexual households.  
                Marriage was created for the begetting of children.  
 
Equality: Everyone is the same and should be treated the same.  
                Gays and lesbians are treated as second-class citizens.  
 
Freedom: Same-sex couples are denied the freedom to marry. 
                  Same-sex couples are denied the freedom to choose who they want to marry.  
                Bill denies the right to liberty and pursuit of happiness.  
 
Nature:  It is natural for men and women to be together, not same-sex couples.  
                We are biologically fated and cannot escape it.  
                Homosexuality is unnatural.  
 
Economy: The cost of giving marriage benefits to same-sex marriages is not practical.  
                   Fiscal rationale of the bill does not allow for same-sex marriage.  
 
Justice:   Need to fulfill the promise of justice.  
 
Diversity: Same-sex marriage promotes diversity which is good for our society.  
 
